University of Tennessee, Knoxville

TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative
Exchange
Doctoral Dissertations

Graduate School

8-2006

Essays on Quantitative Analysis of Supply Chain Structures,
Contracts and Coordination
Xinjie Shi
University of Tennessee - Knoxville

Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss
Part of the Management Sciences and Quantitative Methods Commons

Recommended Citation
Shi, Xinjie, "Essays on Quantitative Analysis of Supply Chain Structures, Contracts and Coordination. " PhD
diss., University of Tennessee, 2006.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/1859

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee
Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact
trace@utk.edu.

To the Graduate Council:
I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Xinjie Shi entitled "Essays on Quantitative
Analysis of Supply Chain Structures, Contracts and Coordination." I have examined the final
electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in
Management Science.
Chanaka Edirisinghe, Major Professor
We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance:
Kenneth Gilbert, Funda Sahin, Charles Noon
Accepted for the Council:
Carolyn R. Hodges
Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)

To the Graduate Council:
I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Xinjie Shi entitled “Essays on
Quantitative Analysis of Supply Chain Structures, Contracts and Coordination.” I have
examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and
recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Management Science.

Chanaka Edirisinghe
Major Professor

We have read this dissertation
and recommend its acceptance:

Kenneth Gilbert
Funda Sahin

Charles Noon

Accepted for the Council:
Anne Mayhew
Vice Chancellor and Dean of
Graduate Studies

(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)

Essays on Quantitative Analysis of Supply
Chain Structures, Contracts and
Coordination

A Dissertation Presented for the Doctor of
Philosophy Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Xinjie Shi
August 2006

Copyright © 2006 by Xinjie Shi
All rights reserved.

ii

To My Wife, and My Parents
Thank you all for your love and support.

iii

Acknowledgements
This dissertation would not have been possible without the support and encouragement
from many people. I would record many of my thanks to my advisor Dr. Chanaka
Edirisinghe. His intelligence, encouragement, and patience helped me to form my
research scope and finally to materialize this dissertation. His sincere research attitude,
attention to details, and hard-working set himself as an example for my research and
future career. I would also express my sincere thanks to Dr. Kenneth Gilbert for his
valuable comments on the dissertation, and for his consideration, patience and
encouragement in the past years. I am grateful to Dr. Charles Noon and Dr. Funda Sahin
as well, for their valuable comments and suggestions on this research, and for serving on
my committee.
I would like to thank other faculty and staff members of the Department of Statistics,
Operations and Management Science. They have made my experience fruitful and
pleasant at the University of Tennessee.
I own a lot to my wife and my parents. Their consistent support, understanding and
love helped me through my pursuit of the Ph. D degree and its success. I am in a great
debt to them for spending so little time with them.

iv

ABSTRACT
This thesis consists of three separate, but related, essays that deal with the topic of how
supply chain structure as well as the use of contracts impact performance of a supply
chain. The main focus is the analysis of behavior of indirect-sale supply chains in terms
of relative bargaining power and decision rights of the participants. Modeling as
Stackelberg games, this thesis explores the existence of Nash equilibriums and the issues
surrounding supply chain coordination.

In Essay one, “The Role of Decision Structure in Supply Chain Coordination with
Stochastic Demand”, the analysis focuses on how different supply chain structures affect
the choice of contracts in coordination under a generalized setting in which more
powerful agent does not necessarily assume the Stackelberg leadership. This study shows
that an optimal coordinating contract is based not only upon the overstock liquidation
advantage the supplier/retailer may have, but also upon the specific decision hierarchy in
the supply chain.

In Essay two, “Supply Chain Performance with Power Imbalanced Suppliers”, studies the
effects of product substitution when suppliers and retailers have an imbalance of decision
making power. In particular, we address the questions of structure dominance and why
certain supply chain power structures are more stable.
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Finally, Essay three, “Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue Sharing Contract when
Retailer Sells Store-Brand Products”, a retailer-dominated supply chain coordination
problem is investigated when the retailer sells store-brand products. Among many
insights developed, it follows that two-parameter revenue-sharing contracts are preferred
to both wholesale-price contacts and one-parameter revenue-sharing contracts in supply
chain coordination due to its flexibility in profit division.

Keywords and Phrases: Supply Chain Structure, Decision and Power Structure,
Wholesale Price Contract, Buyback Contract, Markdown Money Contract, Revenue
Sharing Contract, Coordination, Stackelberg Game, Store Brand.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Preliminaries
This thesis studies the relationship between the structure of a supply chain and its
operational performance. The focus of the thesis is on how structure impacts performance,
as well as the use of contracts for enhanced performance of the supply chain. The term
“structure” is employed to identify how products flow through the supply chain, how
operational decision variables are distributed across the supply chain participants, and
each participant’s influence in decision-making for the supply chain, i.e., relative
bargaining power of participants.
In any decentralized supply chain consisting of independent firms, if individual
decisions turn out to be optimal for the supply chain as a whole, then the supply chain is
referred to as being coordinated. In other words, this supply chain achieves the same
performance (or efficiency) as an integrated supply chain system in which one firm
commits all decisions. However, individual firms may engender inefficient operational
behaviors that serve their own best interests; that is, choosing a lower stocking quantity
and a higher retail price, contrary to those of an integrated system, to maximize one’s
own profits. This leads to the entire supply chain profit becoming inferior to that of the
corresponding integrated system. This phenomenon is usually termed “double
marginalization” (Spengler 1950), a well-known cause of supply chain inefficiency.

1

The optimal supply chain performance can be achieved if individual participants
agree to contract on a set of executions such that each participant’s objective becomes
aligned with the supply chain’s objective, hence resulting in a coordinated supply chain.
Much research has been devoted to identifying and evaluating such contracts to
coordinate supply chains, or at least to improve supply chain efficiency. This dissertation
research draws on, and contributes to, the same growing stream of literature by
emphasizing the impact of supply chain structure on supply chain performance.
A supply chain structure is herein characterized via a three-faceted approach:
product flow, decision rights, and bargaining power. As for product flow, if a supplier
sells products through an intermediary agent such as a retailer, we refer to it as a
traditional indirect-sale structure. Otherwise, if suppliers sell products directly to end
customers, it’s called a direct-sale structure (Chiang et al. 2003). For example, suppliers
may open retail outlets or sell through the internet. A dual structure consisting of both
indirect and direct sale practices is also surging in practice due to the rapid deployment of
information technologies. Yet another product flow structure is “drop-shipping”, where a
retailer acquires end customers through either local stores or the internet, but the supplier
sends products directly to end customers (Netessine and Rudi 2004). In both direct-sale
and drop-shipping, products transfer directly from suppliers to end customers, but the key
difference is that the supplier controls the marketing function in a direct-sale structure,
whereas in drop-shipping, the retailer engages in the marketing activities.
Considering the decision rights facet, a supply chain structure can be identified by
how decision rights are distributed among supply chain participants. Assume a singlesupplier-single-retailer supply chain in which a wholesale price is quoted (Cachon 2004).
2

Two operational decisions must be made in this supply chain: the wholesale price and
stocking level, given that the retail price is fixed. If both the wholesale price and stocking
level decisions are committed by one firm, it is then an integrated supply chain structure.
On the other hand, if the supplier issues the wholesale price and the retailer determines
the stocking level, it is termed a retailer-managed inventory (RMI) structure; when the
supplier determines the stocking level and the retailer chooses the wholesale price, a
vendor-managed inventory (VMI) structure arises.
The third distinguishing feature of a supply chain is the relative bargaining power
of each participant. Bargaining power determines how supply chain decisions are
initiated and how the supply chain profit is distributed among participants. Assuming a
single-supplier-single-retailer supply chain, three alternatives can be identified in this
context: the supplier has more bargaining power than the retailer; the retailer has more
bargaining power than the supplier; or both firms have equal decision making power.
Using the above three-faceted approach, one may characterize the structure of a
given supply chain. However, the focus of this dissertation is limited to indirect-sale
supply chains (thus product flow facet is fixed), and therefore, the supply chain is
analyzed with respect to relative bargaining power and decision rights of the participants.
Consequently, the term supply chain “decision structure” refers to the pair: bargaining
power and decision rights. In the sequel, the term supply chain “power structure” is also
used synonymously with bargaining power.
In modeling supply chain structure, the existing literature conventionally assumes
that a more powerful firm commits decisions first and a less powerful firm issues
decisions second. Within the context of Stackelberg game theory (Stackelberg 1934), an
3

earlier mover (i.e., the first decision maker) is termed the Stackelberg leader, and the
second decision maker is termed the Stackelberg follower. On the other hand, in a supply
chain where multiple suppliers provide substitutable products to a common retailer, all
suppliers are commonly assumed (Choi 1991) to have equal power such that they move
simultaneously in decision-making. These standard assumptions, of course, capture
certain practices in the real world. However, we can also observe operational behaviors
that violate these assumptions. For example, Wal-Mart seeks orders from suppliers in
China and Mexico. While Wal-Mart is more powerful than those suppliers, it does not
necessarily move first to specify the order quantities. In another instance, a personalcomputer manufacturer (e.g. Hewlett Packard) may use central processing units (CPUs)
ordered from different suppliers, but the chip supplier Intel usually dominates in that tier
(New York Times, 2006). Hence, Intel and other niche suppliers cannot be treated as
having equal bargaining power.
In this thesis, these structure-related simplifying assumptions are relaxed. As a
result, more general settings can be explored such as the case when a more powerful firm
is not making the first decisions, or when suppliers are not sharing the same decisionmaking power. We believe such settings are important because they not only capture
practices that have not been addressed in previous research, but also they can impact
supply chain coordination and profit division. Such an exploration can provide useful
insights for both academic and practitioner aspects in supply chain management.
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1.2 Structure of the Thesis
This dissertation consists of three separate, but related, analytical essays that are titled:
1. “The Role of Decision Structure in Supply Chain Coordination with Stochastic
Demand”,
2. “Supply Chain Performance with Power Imbalanced Suppliers”, and
3. “Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue Sharing Contract when Retailer sells
Store-Brand Products”.
The research contributions in each chapter are summarized below.
Chapter 2, “The Role of Decision Structure in Supply Chain Coordination with
Stochastic Demand”, studies a single period supply chain with one supplier/manufacturer
and one retailer. In contrast to the previous literature where one powerful agent assumes
both the roles of Stackelberg leader and supply chain captain, we analyze situations in
which these two roles in the supply chain are not necessarily aligned with the same agent.
We term an agent as a supply chain captain if this agent has more bargaining power than
the other agents such that this agent can choose a contract to organize the supply chain in
an attempt to capture more profit from the supply chain. However, the stocking decision
and pricing decision(s) can be made by either agent. We investigate three forms of
contracts for possible supply chain coordination: wholesale-price contract (Lariviere and
Porteus 2001), buyback contract (Pasternack 1985), and markdown-money contract (Tsay
2001). A wholesale-price contract indicates that the only term of trade between the
supplier and the retailer is the wholesale price, which the retailer uses to order from the
supplier. In a buyback contract, the supplier commits to buy back the unsold products
5

from the retailer subject to certain rules. A markdown-money contract allows the retailer
to salvage the unsold products, but the supplier will still issue a full or partial refund to
the retailer for those unsold merchandise.
This study shows an optimal coordinating contract is based not only upon the
overstock liquidation advantage the supplier/retailer may have, but also upon the existing
decision structure of the supply chain. For instance, when the supplier acts as the
Stackelberg leader, while the retailer owns the liquidation advantage and plays the role of
supply chain captain and determines the stocking level, a wholesale-price contract will
easily coordinate the supply chain. Furthermore, this analysis illustrates that the
Stackelberg leadership is, however, not always necessary for the supply chain captain to
achieve coordination. Moreover, sacrificing the leadership in certain cases allows the
captain to achieve more profit. This study verifies the popularity of the wholesale-price
contract in practice because it can achieve coordination for several supply chain
structures.
Chapter 3, “Supply Chain Performance with Power Imbalanced Suppliers”,
studies a supply chain consisting of two suppliers and one retailer. This essay relaxes the
standard assumption that the two suppliers have “balanced” power in the supply chain –
the assumption that both suppliers move simultaneously and act as either Stackelberg
leaders or Stackelberg followers over the retailer, or the assumption that the two suppliers
and the retailer all move simultaneously in decision making. This research focuses on
situations when the suppliers have an imbalance in their relative power structure such that
one supplier can be the Stackelberg leader over the other supplier. This consideration
allows investigating a total of eight possible power structures, of which, five have not
6

been previously studied. Such structures are modeled as either two-stage or three-stage
Bertrand Stackelberg hierarchies, or a single-stage non-cooperative game, and important
issues such as supply chain performance and stability, and the effects of product
substitution (or product competition) are investigated.

In Chapter 3, the following important conclusions are made:
(1) With increasing product substitution, a multi-supplier-one-retailer supply chain can
achieve coordination asymptotically under a simple wholesale pricing mechanism.
(2) Each supplier’s profit consistently decreases when products become more
substitutable even if the suppliers dominate the retailer, whereas the retailer benefits
from a high degree of substitution regardless of the supply chain power structure.
(3) A “niche” supplier is not necessarily an underdog in the presence of a larger supplier
when seeking to increase the share of its supply chain profit under certain decision
power structures.
(4) In the case of multiple suppliers, “profit percentages” can characterize their relative
power differences more accurately than the respective “absolute profits”.
(5) Certain power-imbalanced channels are shown to dominate others. Moreover, we
show that Manufacturer Stackelberg and Retailer Stackelberg channels are no longer
stable structures (as considered in Choi, 1991) when suppliers are able to behave as if
they are power imbalanced.
This study can be used to address a number of business strategies in practice. For
example, large retailers carry store-brand, along with national-brand substitutable
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products in order to avoid suppliers’ price collusion and to spur price competition. On the
other hand, large suppliers such as those in apparel industries sell through retailers, as
well as opening retail outlets to provide the same products because apparel is a highly
substitutable product type.
In Chapter 4, “Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue Sharing Contract when
Retailer Sells Store-Brand Products”, a retailer-dominated supply chain coordination
problem is analyzed when the retailer sells store-brand products. The existing literature
regarding store brands focuses on identifying and evaluating factors that affect the storebrand success, and the retailers’ incentives to choose store-brand strategies. In contrast,
this essay studies the retailing supply chain coordination using revenue-sharing contracts
when the retailer sells store-brand products. A revenue-sharing contract allows the
supplier to share part of the revenue that the retailer generates from carrying the
supplier’s (outside) products.
In the analysis, the supply chain’s decision hierarchy is modeled as a Stackelberg
game, and it assumes the retailer gains more bargaining power to move earlier than the
outside supplier. Two sets of decision rights (two scenarios) are studied: first, the retailer
determines the outside (product) wholesale price in conjunction with her store-brand
retail price, and the supplier chooses a retail price for himself; second, the retailer
determines the outside retail price along with her own retail price, and the supplier
chooses his own wholesale price. The revenue-sharing rate is determined upon
negotiation in either case. In each scenario, the outside supplier uses decisions to
maximize his own possible profit, but the retailer can either optimize the entire supply
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chain for coordination, i.e., coordinating decisions, or can optimize her own profit
function, i.e., non-coordinating decisions.
This essay shows a two-parameter revenue-sharing contract (with both wholesale
price and revenue-sharing rate) outperforms both the wholesale-price contract and oneparameter revenue-sharing contract (specified with only a revenue sharing rate) in supply
chain coordination due to its flexibility in profit division. Retailer’s coordinating
decisions lower the market share and profitability of the store-brand products. However,
the two-parameter revenue sharing contract allows the retailer to achieve more profit
from the entire supply chain.
It is also demonstrated that when the supplier determines his retail price, and
when the retailer can specify both the wholesale-price and revenue-sharing rate, the
retailer’s coordinating decisions lead to Pareto improvement in contrast to her noncoordinating decisions. However, if the revenue-sharing rate is fixed, the retailer will
make decisions to optimize her own profits instead. Moreover, when the supplier
specifies his wholesale price, a non-coordinating wholesale-price contract is the optimal
choice for the retailer. .

1.3 Scope and Limitations
This thesis offers theoretical studies on the supply chain structure and its impact on the
performance and the use of contracts in the supply chain. We provide closed-form results
in each essay so that insights can be developed for the problem under investigation. The
suggestions so-made can be utilized for enhancing supply chain performance in practice.

9

This thesis has relaxed several assumptions that are widely used in the literature.
However, these analyses are contingent on certain limiting assumptions. For instance,
throughout this thesis, information is assumed symmetric across the supply chain;
although it is common in practice that asymmetric information exists in a supply chain.
This aspect is left as a subject for future research and is not within the scope of this
dissertation.
A second assumption upon which the results are based is the type of demand
functions. In the second and third essays, analyses are conducted based on linear
deterministic demand functions that account for product substitution effects. Such
demand functions are widely used in the literature and have contributed immensely to
generate fruitful insights in numerous cases. Extensions and generalizations to other
forms of demand functions are certainly useful avenues for research beyond this
dissertation.

10

Chapter 2:
The Role of Decision Structure in Supply Chain Coordination with
Stochastic Demand

2.1 Introduction
In a decentralized supply chain with one supplier and one retailer, if both agents seek to
optimize their own expected profits, a sub-optimal solution will be reached. This
phenomenon is termed double marginalization (Spengler 1950), a well known cause of
supply chain inefficiency. That is, the profit of a decentralized supply chain is less than
that of an integrated supply chain due to a lower stock quantity or a higher retail price if
the retail price is endogenously determined. For example, Granot and Yin (2005) show
that with a buyback contract, and with a uniformly distributed demand, uncoordinated
supply chain efficiency is in the order of only 75%. Use of other forms of demand may
lead to even worse theoretical efficiency.
Due to the effect of double marginalization, it is desirable to design proper
contract forms for the decentralized supply chain to improve its efficiency. A well
designed contract can lead to an agent’s individual decision being even optimal as a
whole for the supply chain. In this case, there will be no double marginalization, that is,
the supply chain is coordinated. Contracts that provide coordination have been vastly
studied in the literature. For instance, see return policies (Pasternack 1985, Kandel 1996,
Tsay 2001), revenue sharing (Cachon and Lariviere 2002), quantity discount (Jeuland and
11

Shugan 1983, Weng 1995), quantity flexibility (Tsay 1999), sales rebate (Taylor 2002),
options contract (Barnes-Schuster et al 2002), price discount or “bill back” contracts
(Bernstein and Federgruen 2005). Also, see Cachon (2003), Lariviere (1999), and Sahin
and Robinson (2002) for excellent reviews.
In this chapter, the focus is on the problem of supply chain coordination under
contracts. However, more attention is devoted to the presence of return policies. Return
policies have been studied quite extensively in the literature; a comprehensive review of
return policies and their effects under different settings is given below.
A return policy is a commitment by the supplier/manufacturer to refund the
unsold merchandise to the retailer. Return policies can stimulate retailers to increase the
size of orders because the supplier shares the overstock risk. Meanwhile, return policies
can benefit suppliers as well. Given that there are substitutable products in the market, the
unsatisfied demand will be lost if the retailer is under-stocked. Furthermore, when the
product is new to the market, the retailer has less information about demand than the
supplier and the retailer may become conservative in ordering. Return policies can
eliminate any hesitation in setting a correct stocking quantity. Padmanabhan and Png
(1995) discuss other motivations for return policies, for instance, protecting the brand
image by preventing the retailer from selling stale products or discounting unsold goods,
supporting end-user return policy, etc. Return polices are widely used in industries such
as publishing, pre-recorded music, computer hardware and software, automobile parts,
and apparel.
One general format of return policy implemented in practice is the “buyback
contract”. Under this contract structure, suppliers commit to buy back the unsold products
12

from retailers subject to certain rules. Review of the literature shows that there exist
different forms of buyback contracts. With regard to quantity limitations in return, there
exist partial-return or full-return contracts (Pasternack 1985). With partial return, the
retailer can return either up to a certain percentage of the ordered quantities, or the
quantity ordered in excess of a predefined minimum order quantity, referred to as
“percent rebate policy” and “quantity rebate policy”, respectively, see Webster and Weng
(2000). On the other hand, in a full return contract, the supplier accepts all unsold goods
with full or partial refund per unit returned. The latter contracts are well addressed in the
literature, see Cachon (2003), Emmons and Gilbert (1998), Granot and Yin (2005),
Kandel (1996), Lariviere (1999), Padmanabhan and Png (1997), Pasternack (1985), and
Tsay (2001), for instance.
Consider a decentralized supply chain with two risk-neutral agents, the supplier
and the retailer. Assume that information is symmetric across the supply chain. Suppose
the retailer faces a price insensitive stochastic demand. Then, the supply chain
participants’ decision problem can be formulated as a newsvendor model. At the
beginning of a single selling season, the supplier acts first as a Stackelberg leader to issue
a buyback contract and the retailer follows with a stocking decision. Under this setting,
Pasternack (1985) shows that a full-return-partial-refund buyback contract can coordinate
the supply chain. Furthermore, the coordinating contract in this case has the property that
increasing the buyback price yields a higher wholesale price, which thus benefits the
supplier rather than the retailer.
Using the same setting as Pasternack, Kandel (1996) examines the problem from
an economic perspective. In particular, Kandel assumes both agents optimize their own
13

expected profits and addresses how agents’ bargaining power influences contracting
decisions. Kandel shows that the supplier prefers a “consignment contract” in which both
the wholesale price and buyback price equal to the retail price if the supplier has more
bargaining power. In contrast, when the retailer has more bargaining power, she favors a
non-return (wholesale price only) contract.
Krishnan, Kapuscinski and Butz (2004) introduce retail promotional effort into
Pasternack’s setting, which is independent of the demand distribution. They assume the
retailer stocks before observing the market demand, but she exerts promotional effort
after observing the demand. If supply chain agents individually optimize their decisions,
then the full-return buyback is better for the retailer in contrast to a non-return policy;
however, any advantage to the supplier is ambiguous. Two buyback variants are
introduced for coordination and Pareto improvement: effort-sharing buyback and
buyback with sales rebate. The “quantity rebate policy” (one form of partial return as
termed in Webster and Weng, 2000) can coordinate the supply chain, but if this results in
any profit advantages to either agent over the uncoordinated supply chain remain unclear.
Dealing mainly with sales rebates, Taylor (2002) shows the “buyback with sales
rebate” can coordinate the supply chain when exercising the retail promotional effort
before the exact demand is revealed. One key finding is that buyback alone cannot
coordinate the supply chain, regardless of whether the demand distribution depends on
the effort – see, Cachon (2002) for the analysis when the demand distribution is
dependent on the effort.
If the assumption of price independence of demand is relaxed from the Pasternack
(1985) model, a buyback contract no longer coordinates the supply chain (Lariviere 1999,
14

Bernstein and Federgruen 2005, and Cachon 2003). However, the buyback contract may
still be better for both agents in contrast to a wholesale-price contract (Emmons and
Gilbert, 1998). Granot and Yin (2005) demonstrate that this attribute depends on the
demand properties. When the average demand function is nonlinear, e.g., a negative
power function, a buyback contract may no longer be superior to a wholesale-price
contract from the supplier’s perspective.
In the preceding models, information symmetry is assumed for supply chain
agents. In contrast, Ha (2001) investigates a situation when the retailer incurs a marginal
cost, which is private, for each product it orders. In contrast to the coordinated situation
that occurs when information is symmetric, coordination is un-reachable, and a higher
retail price and lower stocking quantity will be observed in this case. Lariviere (2002)
studies the case where the retailer is capable of gaining more accurate demand
information through costly forecasting, and compares the performance of a buyback
contract and a quantity flexibility contract, which is a “percent rebate policy” with a full
refund. Sahin and Robinson (2002) offer an excellent review on physical flow
coordination in terms of the degree of information sharing.
In all of the preceding work, buyback contracts are studied within the framework
of risk neutrality. However, Gan, Sethi and Yan (2004) show that buybacks combined
with a “side payment” can coordinate the supply chain when both agents are risk averse.
Tsay (2002) adopts Padmanabhan and Png (1997)’s demand model to analyze how risk
sensitivity affects agents’ decisions and how a return policy alters those dynamics. In
such a case, ignoring risk sensitivity can dramatically affect supplier’s profit.
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In the previous work, stochastic demand is investigated within a newsvendor
model to analyze supply chain contracts. However, in Padmanabhan and Png (1997), and
Butz (1997), uncertain demand is modeled by two linear demand functions within a
binomial distribution with fixed probabilities. The retailer stocks before knowing which
demand curve is realized, but the retail price is set after the demand function is observed.
Padmanabhan and Png show that when demand is uncertain, a buyback contract increases
the supplier profit by attenuating retail price competition if demand is low or intensifying
competition if demand is high, given that both agents are self-interested. Unlike
Padmanabhan and Png (1997), in which the retailer’s stocking quantity is assumed to be
lower than the high demand and a full-return-full-refund policy is employed, Butz (1997)
assumes a full-return-partial-refund policy, and the retailer is persuaded to order the same
quantity as in the case of high demand. In this context, the retailer has the intention to
lower the retail price to sell more than the system-wide optimized quantity.
Marvel and Peck (1995) model the demand uncertainty in two parts: customer
arrivals uncertainty and uncertainty over consumers’ valuation of the products. The
uncertainty in customer arrivals induces the supplier to offer a buyback contract, whereas
valuation uncertainty results in the retailer setting a higher retail price. This model
partially explains why suppliers can be conservative in offering return mechanisms.
Another form of return policy contracts is referred to as “markdown-money”
(Tsay 2001). Unlike buyback contracts, the supplier gives up the salvage opportunity to
the retailer but still compensates the retailer with partial credit for each unsold unit. This
contract format applies to products whose unit production cost is low, and thus, salvage
value is trivial and the supplier can avoid product-return related costs, e.g. transportation
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cost and storage cost. Tsay concludes that the specific format of this return policy is
influenced by the salvage advantage. That is, if the supplier holds the salvage advantage,
coordination can be reached by a buyback contract; otherwise, a markdown-money
contract will coordinate the supply chain.
All preceding literature is based on one conventional assumption: the agent that
holds the negotiation power moves as the Stackelberg leader in the decision hierarchy.
This assumption results from a fact that in a Stackelberg game hierarchy, first-moving
agent has the advantage to choose the best action set if it can perfectly anticipate the
second-moving agent’s response. However, the main concern of each agent is to achieve
as much profit as possible from the supply chain, but it must be noted that the
Stackelberg leadership position cannot always guarantee more profit. For example, GalOr (1985) and Dowrick (1986) prove that if the profit functions are upwards sloping, the
Stackelberg follower will achieve more profit when each agent intends to maximize his
own profit; Lariviere and Porteus (2001) conclude that the Stackelberg follower may
capture more profit than the Stackelberg leader does using a simple wholesale-price
contract.
In this chapter, we assume that a powerful agent need not necessarily be a
Stackelberg leader; furthermore, the stocking decision and the pricing decision(s) of a
contract can be set by either agent. These relaxations allow us to consider ten possible
structures, some of which have been addressed in the literature; however, we provide a
more in-depth analysis. For example, Kandel (1996) studies the scenario that the retailer
holds the negotiation power and the pricing right, and each agent intends to optimize its
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own profit. We illustrate under this scenario how coordination can be reached using
contracts.
We study a newsvendor model and investigate three contracts for coordination:
wholesale-price contract, buyback contract, and markdown-money contract. Our study
shows that a supply chain-coordinating contact depends not only upon the salvage
advantage that the supplier/retailer may have, but also upon the existing decision
structure. For example, Tsay (2001) identifies that when the retailer has the salvage
advantage, only a markdown-money contract can coordinate the supply chain. We show
that it is true when the supplier holds the negotiation power and functions as the
Stackelberg leader, but in other cases, the markdown-money contract is outperformed by
a wholesale-price contract with respect to coordination. Meanwhile, a Stackelberg
leadership position is not always necessary for a powerful agent in achieving
coordination; moreover, sacrificing the leadership in certain cases allows the agent to
achieve more profit. For example, a retailer that has the negotiation power can be betteroff acting as a Stackelberg follower in choosing the stocking level, instead of being a
Stackelberg leader. Managerial insights are also discussed in the sequel.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 contains the
model assumptions, and illustrations of the supply chain decision structure by clarifying
the difference between the Stackelberg leader/follower positions and the bargaining
power positions in a supply chain. Section 2.3 provides an integrated supply chain model
as the benchmark. Section 2.4 investigates three contract formats when the supplier
serves as both the supply chain captain and the Stackelberg leader. Sections 2.5-2.9
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discuss which contract(s) should be employed for coordination under various decision
structures. Conclusions are in Section 2.10.

2.2 Model Assumptions and Supply Chain Decision Structures
2.2.1 Model Assumptions
We consider a supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer in a single period.
All decision makers are risk neutral and information is symmetric within the supply
chain. The supply chain faces a stochastic demand; thus, a newsvendor model can be
employed to determine the stocking decision before agents observe the demand.
Furthermore, the retail price is exogenously determined before the selling season and it
will remain constant throughout the selling season. We further assume that the production
cost is the only cost faced by the supplier. The retailer does not suffer any cost except
paying a wholesale price per unit to the supplier. The supplier has no capacity limitation
in determining the stock size. At the end of the selling season, either the supplier will buy
back and salvage the unsold products, or the retailer will salvage the unsold items per
contract terms if such exist. Either party can have the unsold-product salvage advantage,
and neither one suffers a loss of goodwill due to possible unsatisfied customer demand.
We use the following notations throughout the chapter.

π R : retailer’s expected profit;
π M : supplier/manufacturer’s expected profit;
π SC = π M + π R : supply chain expected profit;
π I : integrated supply chain expected profit;
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p: retail price per unit;
w: wholesale price per unit;
c: supplier production cost per unit;
sM: salvage value per unit from the supplier;
sR: salvage value per unit from the retailer;
s = max{sM , sR } ;
b: buyback price per unit;
m: markdown-money price per unit;
Q: stocking quantity;
x: stochastic market demand (r.v. and x ≥ 0);
f(x): demand p.d.f. function , f(x) ≥ 0;
F(x): demand c.d.f. function;
E[.]: mathematical expectation w.r.t F(x).
To avoid any arbitrage opportunity to any agent, we have the following parameter
constraints: c ≤ w ≤ p and 0 < sM (or sR ) ≤ c ≤ b ≤ p .

2.2.2 Supply Chain Decision Structures
In a traditional supply chain structure, the supplier assumes the wholesale-pricing right,
while the retailer specifies the stocking size whilst retaining the inventory. VendorManaged Inventory (VMI) represents another structure in which the supplier is endowed
with stocking decision rights, but the retailer still owns the inventory (see, e.g., Bernstein
et al. 2005). The recent advances in information technology has lead to two more supply
chain strategies: direct sales and drop-shipping practices. In direct sales practice, a
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supplier overlooks the intermediary retailer and sells products directly to the end
customers. Therefore, the supplier specifies the stocking size, owns the inventory and
overstock risk. However, the choice of either a traditional structure, a direct sales
structure, or a dual structure that combines both the traditional and direct sales practices
may depend on the characteristics of the competitive circumstances such as customer
acceptance of the products, see Chiang et al (2003), for instance.
In drop-shipping practice, the retailer assumes the marketing function to acquire
customers through either the internet or local retail stores; the supplier is responsible for
holding inventories and transferring products directly to the end customers. The supplier
in general is associated with the stocking rights and owns the overstock risk, but it may
not have the negotiation power in comparison to the retailer. See Netessine and Rudi
(2004) for in-depth discussions.
Our supply chain decision structure is mainly defined based on the traditional
supply chain features: the retailer owns the inventories; the overstock risk can be
associated with either party, or both. In contrast, the decision structure incorporates a
flexibility that, as noted earlier, each supply chain participant can specify the stocking
decision or pricing decision, and either one can move as a Stackelberg leader regardless
of who carries the bargaining power.
For the ease of exposition, we call the more powerful agent, the supply chain
captain, and the other, the supply chain associate. At the beginning of a selling season,
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the supply chain captain 1 will choose a contract format to organize the supply chain; the
supply chain associate will accept the contract type and participate in the supply chain if
such contract and relevant terms assure enough profit. Since coordination generates the
same total supply chain profit as the integrated system, and since the captain is capable of
achieving more profit than the associate does from the supply chain, the captain thus has
the incentive to seek coordination. In contrast, the supply chain associate will always try
to maximize his own profit in the decision making process.
Stocking and pricing parameters are present in all three contract formats discussed
here, namely, wholesale-price, buyback, and markdown-money contracts. A given agent
may determine one or more (or none) of the above parameters in a decentralized supply
chain. After the captain chooses a contract type, the contracting terms are determined
over time, and thus, the contracting process can be modeled as a Stackelberg game.
Let H be a contract format chosen by the captain. Let S H be the subset of contract
terms (parameters) determined by the Stackelberg leader under the contract format H, and

S H be the remaining subset of contract terms chosen by the Stackelberg follower.
Furthermore, let the index 1 refer to the captain and 2 refer to the associate. The supply
chain decision structure can then be modeled as the following three-stage dynamic
decision process:
Captain (1) determines H Æ Leader (1 or 2) determines S H Æ Follower (2 or 1)
determines S H .
1

In the remainder of this essay, we may use “captain” and “associate” to refer to the supply chain captain
and supply chain associate, while “leader” and “follower” are used to refer to the Stackelberg leader and
Stackelberg follower, respectively.
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Using P to represent the contract’s pricing term and D to represent the stocking
term, we list ten possible dynamics in Table 2.1 for the supply chain decision structure,
where an empty set (Ø) indicates the case when an agent is not making decisions.
The first two structures S1 and S2 in Table 2.1 represent the case of an integrated
supply chain where either the supplier or the retailer makes both the stocking and the
pricing decisions. However, the remaining eight structures are concerned with a
decentralized supply chain. We investigate how these decision structures influence the
choice of contracts for supply chain coordination in the remainder of this chapter.

2.3 Integrated Supply Chains (S1 & S2)
In an integrated supply chain, one agent makes all decisions for the entire supply chain,
whereas in a decentralized supply chain, each agent is free to make its own decision.
Thus, an integrated situation leads to the highest total profits possible in a supply chain,
and we use the integrated supply chain as a benchmark to measure the performance of
decentralized supply chains.
Table 2.1: Ten Possible Decision Structures
Structure
S1
S2
S3
S4
S5
S6
S7
S8
S9
S10

Captain
Supplier
Retailer
Supplier
Retailer
Retailer
Retailer
Supplier
Supplier
Retailer
Supplier

Leader
Supplier (P, D)
Retailer (P, D)
Supplier (P)
Supplier (P)
Retailer (D)
Retailer (P)
Retailer (P)
Supplier (D)
Supplier (D)
Retailer (D)
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Follower
Retailer (Ø)
Supplier (Ø)
Retailer (D)
Retailer (D)
Supplier (P)
Supplier (D)
Supplier (D)
Retailer (P)
Retailer (P)
Supplier (P)

The integrated supply chain’s total expected profit:

π I = pE [ min[ x, Q]] + sE [ max[0, Q − x]] − cQ .

(2.3.1)

The first term in the right hand side of (2.3.1) corresponds to the expected revenue; the
second term corresponds to the expected salvage value from the unsold products; and the
third is the total production cost. Upon simplification,
Q

π I = ( p - c)Q - ( p - s) ∫ F ( x)dx .
0

(2.3.2)

Since π I is concave in Q , setting d π I dQ = ( p − c) − ( p − s ) F (Q) = 0 leads to
QI * = F −1 (

p−c
),
p−s

(2.3.3)

and QI* is stock quantity that maximizes π I . With a given retail price, the maximized
expected supply chain profit is then,

π I * = (p-c) F −1 (

p −c
)
F −1 (
p−c
) -(p- s) ∫ p − s F ( x)dx .
0
p−s

(2.3.4)

Both the optimized stocking quantity and supply chain profit increase in the
salvage value s, the decision maker will thus assign the agent having the salvage
advantage (not necessarily himself) the salvaging rights of the unsold products.
In any decentralized supply chain with each partner trying to maximize its own
*
*
is the maximized profit of a decentralized supply
profit, we have π SC
≤ π I* , where π SC

chain. However, if a contract can be designed such that it enables the agent having the
salvage advantage to salvage the unsold products, and QI* turns out to be the order size of
*
= π *I can be attained, i.e., the supply chain can be
the agent who determines Q , then π SC
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coordinated. We investigate how salvage advantage affects the choice of contracts for
coordination in each of the decentralized supply chain decision structure in the following
sections.

2.4 S3: Supplier (Captain/Leader/P) vs. Retailer (Associate/Follower/D)
In S3, the supplier is the supply chain captain who determines the contract type, as well
as the Stackelberg leader in determining P, one subset of contract parameters; and the
retailer (associate), plays the role of Stackelberg follower to choose the stocking size. We
investigate three contract types for coordination: the wholesale-price contract, buyback
contract, and markdown-money contract.

2.4.1 Wholesale Price Contract
Wholesale-price contracts have seen numerous applications in practice and they have
been extensively explored in the literature, see Lariviere and Porteus (2001), and Cachon
(2004) for recent work in this regard. Under a wholesale-price contract, the contract’s
pricing term P refers to the wholesale price w. The two agents’ expected profit functions
are,

π M =(w-c)Q

(2.4.1)
Q

π R =(p-w)Q-(p- sR)E[Q-x]+= (p-w)Q- ( p − sR ) ∫ F ( x)dx .
0

(2.4.2)

The supply chain expected profit is then
Q

π SC = ( p − c)Q − ( p − sR ) E[Q − x ]+ = ( p − c)Q − ( p − sR ) ∫ F ( x)dx .
0
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(2.4.3)

Under S3, using backward induction, we first calculate the Stackelberg follower (retailer)
stocking quantity that maximizes its own expected profit. Given a retail price and a
wholesale price, the retailer’s profit function (2.4.2) is concave and the unique optimum
order size:
Q * = F −1 (

p−w
).
p − sR

(2.4.4)

The supplier has two options in choosing the wholesale price: either optimize the
total supply chain profit function, or optimize its own profit function. With former option,
substituting (2.4.4) in (2.4.3), solve
⎛ p−w ⎞
F −1 ⎜
⎛ p−w ⎞
⎟
⎝ p − sR ⎠ F ( x ) dx .
max π SC = ( p − c) F −1 ⎜
−
(
p
−
sR
)
⎟
∫
0
w
⎝ p − sR ⎠

(2.4.5)

The first order optimality condition of (2.4.5) yields w* = c , and the second order
condition reveals that w* = c solves (2.4.5). However, the supplier achieves no profit
when w* = c . Furthermore, because Q* in (2.4.4) increases in s, substituting w* = c in
*
(2.4.4), we have Q* = F −1 ( ( p − c) /( p − sR ) ) ≤ QI* = F −1 ( ( p − c) /( p − s) ) and π SC
≤ π I*

due to sR ≤ sM . This result is due to the fact that the retailer is responsible for salvaging
the unsold products under a wholesale-price contract whereas it does not have the salvage
advantage ( sR ≤ sM ). Therefore, the supplier has to set w* = c when sR = s , or w* < c if
sR < sM to ensure coordination. That is, the supplier would need to loose money in order
to maintain the performance of the supply chain.
On the other hand, the supplier may choose a wholesale price to maximize its own
possible profit. Because the optimized wholesale price in this case is subject to the
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inversion of the demand distribution, and a closed-form inversion of the c.d.f. is not
always available for general distributions, we assume a uniformly distributed demand
with f(x) = 1/ 2 β , where x ∈ [0, 2 β ] and β > 0 . In this case, the supplier’s optimized
wholesale

price

is

w*= ( p + c ) / 2 >c,

which

leads

to

the

β ( p − c ) /( p − sR )

π M* = β ( p − c) 2 /(2( p − sR )) ; the retailer orders

expected

profit

and achieves

π R* = β ( p − c) 2 /(4( p − sR )) ; and the total supply chain profit is 3β ( p − c) 2 /(4( p − sR )) .
For benchmarking, the relevant coordinating order size is 2β ( p − c) /( p − sR ) and supply
chain profit is β ( p − c ) 2 /( p − sR ) (given that sR ≥ sM ). Consequently, the supplier
benefits by optimizing its own profit function even though the retailer orders 50% less
than the coordinating order size; and the supply chain total profit is 25% less than the
case of the coordinated supply chain.

2.4.2 Buyback Contract
The buyback contract represents a major form of return policies, where the retailer can
return the unsold products to the supplier and claim refund per item. Here we consider a
full-return-partial-refund buyback contract. Our analysis follows Pasternack (1985), the
first work discussing coordination using buyback contracts. In this case,
Q

π M =(w-c)Q-(b- sM) E[Q-x]+= (w-c)Q-(b- sM) ∫ F ( x)dx
0

Q

π R = ( p − w)Q − ( p − b) E[Q − x]+ = ( p − w)Q − ( p − b) ∫ F ( x)dx ,
0

(2.4.6)
(2.4.7)

and the entire supply chain’s expected profit
Q

π SC = π M + π R = ( p − c)Q − ( p − sM ) ∫ F ( x)dx .
0
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(2.4.8)

The retailer’s optimized order quantity:
Q* = F −1 (

p−w
).
p −b

(2.4.9)

Substituting (2.4.9) in (2.4.8) and taking the first order derivative w.r.t. w, and letting
dπ SC / dw =0, we have
w* =

p ( c − sM ) + b ( p − c )
.
p − sM

(2.4.10)

The second order condition d 2π SC / dw2 < 0 . Therefore, if the supplier chooses a
wholesale price of (2.4.10), the entire supply chain has the largest possible profit. Note
that the optimized wholesale price is independent of the demand distribution and it
increases in the buyback price.
The supply chain profit function (2.4.8) is not jointly concave in (w, b) when the
supplier determines the prices, which allows the supply chain to be optimized with a
series of solutions of (w, b) (also see Lariviere 1998); namely, the coordinated supply
chain profit can be smoothly divided between the two agents by changing the buyback
price. The determination of the buyback price depends on the bargaining power between
the two agents.
Substituting (2.4.10) in (2.4.9) leads to Q* = F −1 (( p − c ) /( p − sM )) . The supply
chain is coordinated when the supplier has the salvage advantage ( sM = s ). Using w* see
(2.4.10), in (2.4.6) and (2.4.7),
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πM* =

p −c
F −1 (
)
( p − c)(b − sM ) −1 p − c
F (
) − (b − sM ) ∫ p − sM F ( x)dx
0
p − sM
p − sM
p −c
F −1 (
)
⎧
⎫
p−c
−1
p − sM
p
c
F
p
s
F ( x)dx ⎬
(
−
)
(
)
−
(
−
)
⎨
M ∫
0
p − sM
⎩
⎭

=

b − sM
p − sM

=

b − sM
π SC *
p − sM

π R* =

(2.4.11)

p −c
)
F −1 (
( p − c)( p − b) −1 p − c
F (
) − ( p − b ) ∫ p − s M F ( x ) dx
0
p − sM
p − sM

p −c
F −1 (
)
⎫
p −b ⎧
p−c
−1
) − ( p − sM ) ∫ p − sM F ( x)dx ⎬ ,
⎨( p − c ) F (
0
p − sM ⎩
p − sM
⎭
p −b
π SC *
=
p − sM

=

*
where π SC
= ( p − c) F −1 (

(2.4.12)

p −c
)
F −1 (
p−c
) − ( p − sM ) ∫ p − sM F ( x)dx .
0
p − sM

It is clear that the supplier’s expected profit increases, while the retailer’s
expected profit decreases in the buyback price.
Similar to Bernstein and Federgruen (2005), since 0 < sM ≤ b ≤ p , set
b = s M + α ( p − sM ) ,

(2.4.13)

where α ∈ [0,1] . Substituting (2.4.13) back into (2.4.10)-(2.4.12) leads to
w* = c + α ( p − c) , π M * = απ SC * , π R* = (1 − α )π SC * .

(2.4.14)

Proposition 2.4.1: Under a buyback contract:
(a) If sM ≥ sR , the buyback contract coordinates the supply chain; when sR > sM , the
supply chain cannot be coordinated with a buyback contract.
(b) Improving the buyback price increases the wholesale price, and thus increases the
supplier’s profit at the expense of the retailer’s profitability.
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(c) The optimal wholesale price is independent of the demand distribution.
In the case when the retailer has the salvage advantage ( sR ≥ sM ), the buyback contract
cannot coordinate the supply chain since Q* = F −1 (( p − c ) /( p − sM )) < QI* , even if the
supplier optimizes the entire supply chain.
Intuitively, a higher buyback price allows more profit to the retailer in that the
supplier compensates more to the retailer for the unsold products. However, a higher
buyback price corresponds to a higher α according to (2.4.13), and the retailer has to pay
a higher wholesale price to the supplier, which allows the supplier to share a higher
percentage of the supply chain profit at the expense of the retailer, see (2.4.14).
Due to the property (c) in Proposition 2.4.1, the supplier can contract with
multiple independent retailers using a uniform buyback contract and save the cost for
negotiating and managing terms of contracts with each retailer. More importantly, such a
uniform contract policy is within the Robinson-Patman Act 2 , a Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) act that prohibits the seller from using discriminatory prices on
buyers at the same functional level.
Comment: Intuitively, the buyback price can be as low as sR when sM > sR , but the
supplier will incur a negative profit if the buyback price is less than sM . To see this, let
b = sR + α ( p − sR ) , then according to (2.4.10)-(2.4.12),
*
w* = p − (1 − α ) ( ( p − sR )( p − c) /( p − sM ) ) , π M* = (1 − (1 − α )( p − sR ) /( p − sM ) ) π SC
, and
*
π R* = ( (1 − α )( p − sR ) /( p − sM ) ) π SC
.

2

From www.ftc.gov
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*
That is, when sR ≤ b < sM , we have w* < c , π M* < 0 , and π R* > π SC
, the supplier achieves

a negative profit.
To summarize, π I * = π BSC * ≥ π WSC * in S3 if sM = s , where π BSC * and π WSC *
represent the expected supply chain profits when the supplier optimizes the entire supply
chain using the buyback contract and wholesale-price contract, respectively. The supplier
can use the buyback contract for coordination when

sM ≥ sR . Alternatively,

π I * = π WSC * > π BSC * when sR ≥ sM , while the supplier has no incentive for coordination
without any make-up arrangement such as a side payment. A markdown-money contract
overcomes this shortcoming.

2.4.3 Markdown-money Contract
The markdown-money contract is a form of return policy, see Tsay (2001), where the
supplier allows the retailer to salvage the unsold products and keep the salvage values.
Furthermore, the supplier pays a markdown price for each unsold unit to the retailer.
Markdown-money contracts appear in situations such as when retailer has the salvage
advantage. For instance, in the publishing industry, unsold products may have little
salvage value while the overstock processing and transportation costs remain relatively
high. In such a case, the retailer should salvage the unsold items instead of returning them
to the supplier. The supplier only requests the retailer to tear off the front pages or other
identifications of the unsold items to claim markdown credits.
The markdown-money contract has the following profit functions:
Q

π M = ( w − c)Q − mE[Q − x]+ = ( w − c)Q − m ∫ F ( x)dx
0
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(2.4.15)

Q

π R = ( p − w)Q − ( p − (m + sR )) E[Q − x]+ = ( p − w)Q − ( p − (m + sR )) ∫ F ( x)dx
0

Q

π SC = ( p − c)Q − ( p − sR ) ∫ F ( x)dx .

(2.4.16)
(2.4.17)

0

Again, the retailer’s profit function is concave in Q and it can be shown that
Q* = F −1 (

p−w
).
p − ( m + sR )

(2.4.18)

Substituting (2.4.18) in (2.4.17) and with a given markdown price m,
d π SC
−( p − c )
( p − sR )( p − w)
=
+
=0
dw
[ p − (m + sR )] f ( x0 ) [ p − (m + sR )]2 f ( x0 )
⇒ w* =

c ( p − sR ) + m( p − c )
.
p − sR

(2.4.19)

The second order condition indicates w* in (2.4.19) leads to a global maximum of
(2.4.17). Substituting w* into (2.4.18),
Q * = F −1 (

p−c
).
p − sR

(2.4.20)

Furthermore, substituting (2.4.19) and (2.4.20) in (2.4.15) and (2.4.16),

πM

*

π R* =

p −c
F −1 (
)
m( p − c) −1 p − c
m
p − sR
=
F (
) − m∫
F ( x)dx =
π SC *
0
p − sR
p − sR
p − sR
p −c
F −1 (
)
( p − c)( p − (m + sR )) −1 p − c
F (
) − ( p − (m + sR )) ∫ p − sR F ( x)dx
0
p − sR
p − sR

p − ( m + sR )
π SC *
=
p − sR
where π SC

*

p −c
F −1 (
)
p−c
p − sR
= ( p − c) F (
) − ( p − sR ) ∫
F ( x)dx .
0
p − sR
−1
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(2.4.21)

,

(2.4.22)

To avoid any retailer arbitrage, the markdown price should be no larger than (psR). Let m = α ( p − sR ) , where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 . Then,
*
*
, and π R* = (1 − α )π MSC
.
w* = c + α ( p − c) , π M* =απ MSC

(2.4.23)

When α =0, m=0 and w=c, and the markdown-money contract is equivalent to a
wholesale-price contract in which case the supplier achieves no profit.
Except for salvaging unsold products on the retailer side, the markdown-money
contract functions the same way as a buyback contract as shown in (2.4.14) and (2.4.23).
Consequently, the following conclusions can be similarly achieved under a markdownmoney contract.
Proposition 2.4.2: Under a markdown-money contract,
(a) When sR = s , a markdown-money contract coordinates the supply chain.
Markdown price can be used to allocate the supply chain profit between the
supplier and the retailer at any desirable proportion.
(b) Increasing the markdown-money price increases the supplier’s profit at the
expense of the retailer’s profitability.
(c) The optimum wholesale price is independent of the demand distribution.

Overall, we have the following conclusions for S3.
Proposition 2.4.3: When the supplier has the salvage advantage ( sM ≥ sR ), the buyback
contract coordinates the supply chain; if the retailer has the salvage advantage
( sR ≥ sM ), the supplier will use a markdown-money contract for coordination. The
wholesale-price contract shall not be used for coordination in S3.
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2.5 S4: Supplier (Associate/Leader/P) vs. Retailer (Captain/Follower/D)
The preceding section investigated which contract can coordinate the supply chain when
the supplier serves as both the supply chain captain and the Stackelberg leader. S4 has the
same Stackelberg game hierarchy as in S3 except that the retailer acts as the captain.
Before the selling season, the retailer chooses a contract type, the supplier is then allowed
to announce the price(s) first, and the retailer follows with a stocking decision.

2.5.1 Wholesale Price Contract
Assuming that the retailer adopts a wholesale-price contract, S4 has the same profit
functions as those of the S3 under a wholesale-price contract. (In fact, in all three types of
contracts under analysis, the relevant profit functions remain unchanged among all eight
decentralized structures.) The supplier sets a wholesale price such that c ≤ w ≤ p . As the
captain, the retailer will choose the stocking level Q* = F −1 (( p − c ) /( p − sR )) to optimize
the supply chain.
Note that the supplier’s wholesale price is not an optimized result in this structure,
and the retailer’s global stocking decision does not depend on the wholesale price. These
observations may mislead us that the supplier can set any wholesale price it wants.
However, if the wholesale price is set too high, the captain (retailer) can refuse to order
from the supplier. There are two ways to determine the wholesale price: supplier bidding
and negotiation. When the supply market is competitive, the retailer will choose a
supplier that bids with the lowest wholesale price. Alternatively, the retailer can target
one supplier and negotiate the wholesale price as low as possible; otherwise, she will
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threaten not to contract with that supplier. Due to information symmetry, the supplier
knows the retailer will order a large stocking quantity and it realizes that requesting a
high wholesale price may leave itself substituted by other suppliers. The supplier will
thus join the supply chain when the wholesale price goes beyond its target level.
The wholesale-price contract leads to the supply chain coordination if sR > sM .
Furthermore, in contrast to the markdown-money contract, a wholesale-price contract has
fewer pricing terms such that it is easier to implement, and thus outperforms the
markdown-money contract for coordination.
S4 wholesale-price contract can well address decision processes in large retailing
supply chains. For instance, Wal-Mart seeks orders from suppliers (like Chinese and
Mexican vendors) that have the lowest wholesale prices (and in general having the lowest
production costs). The suppliers’ profit margins minimal, but they are guaranteed with
large orders by the retailer.

2.5.2 Buyback Contract
When sM ≥ sR , a buyback contract should be introduced for coordination. Like the
wholesale-price contract, a buyback contract’s pricing terms, the wholesale price and
buyback price, are not solely determined by the supplier. Rather, their determination
relies on the firms’ bargaining power and the competitiveness of the supply market. The
captain and follower (retailer) will choose the stocking size Q* = F −1 (( p − c ) /( p − sM )) to
coordinate the supply chain.
The S4 buyback contract distinguishes with that of S3 in that the wholesale price
in S4 is no longer a function of the buyback price. That is, with a given wholesale price,
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increasing the buyback price will benefit the retailer; if the buyback price is fixed, a
higher wholesale price will benefit the supplier. As such, the retailer can negotiate a
higher buyback price as well as a lower wholesale price to achieve more profit. This
property is consistent with the common intuition that a high buyback price benefits the
retailer while a high wholesale price benefits the supplier.
Proposition 2.5.1: In S4, the wholesale-price contract coordinates the supply chain when
sR ≥ sM , while the buyback contract is employed for coordination if sM ≥ sR . The
determination of the contracts’ pricing terms depends on both firms’ bargaining power
and the competitiveness of the supply market.

2.6 S5: Supplier (Associate/Follower/P) vs. Retailer (Captain/Leader/D)
In S5, the captain retailer serves as the Stackelberg leader in dictating the stocking size,
and the supplier follows with a pricing decision. Similar to S4, the captain (retailer) can
choose either a wholesale-price contract or a buyback contract for coordination per the
salvage advantage, and commits an order quantity that optimizes the supply chain.
However, the coordinating stocking decision in either contract is a function of the
supplier’s production cost, which results in different stocking quantities with respect to
different suppliers. Therefore, this decision structure leads to higher transaction costs for
the retailer due to the fact that the retailer has to specify different stocking levels in light
of a number of suppliers and negotiate prices with each of them. Meanwhile, the supplierbidding option in setting pricing terms is not applied in S4. Consequently, the S5 decision
hierarchy is outperformed by S4 from the retailer’s perspective.
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2.7 S6: Supplier (Associate/Follower/D) vs. Retailer (Captain/Leader/P)
In S6, the retailer determines the contract type as well as the pricing terms, while the
supplier follows with a stocking decision. Kandel (1996) analyzes the same structure but
assumes both agents seek to maximize their own profits, We investigate situations when
the retailer seeks coordination in its decision making.

2.7.1 Wholesale Price Contract
Under a wholesale-price contract, the retailer chooses a wholesale price w such that w>c
to have the supplier involved in the supply chain, and the follower (supplier) determines a
stocking quantity. Note that the supplier’s decision problem (2.4.1) is a linear function of
Q, and the supplier bears no overstock risk in this case. Therefore, with a positive profit
margin, the supplier has the incentive to supply a quantity of products that exceeds the
supply chain optimum. On the other hand, the retailer bears the overstock risk, and will
not accept the extra products above the stocking level that optimizes the supply chain,
and in this case, coordination is developed if sR = s . One point worth mentioning is, if
the wholesale price is set below the supplier’s expectation, the supplier can stock less
than QI* , and thus coordination is not available in such a case.

2.7.2 Buyback and Markdown-money Contracts
In contrast to wholesale-price contracts, the buyback contract and markdown-money
contract may also develop coordination by sharing the overstock risk with the supplier.
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Under a buyback contract, the supplier chooses a stocking level to maximize its own
profit in (2.4.6), and we thus obtain,
Q * = F −1 (

w−c
).
b − sM

(2.7.1)

Substituting (2.7.1) in the supply chain profit function (2.4.8) and under the first order
conditions of optimality,
w* =

p ( c − sM ) + b ( p − c )
.
p − sM

(2.7.2)

Letting b = sM + α ( p − sM ) , where α ∈ [0,1] , then
w* = c + α ( p − c) , π M = α π SC * , π R =(1- α ) π SC * ,
where π SC * = ( p − c) F −1 (

(2.7.3)

p −c
F −1 (
)
p−c
) − ( p − sM ) ∫ p − sM F ( x)dx . The above results are
0
p − sM

identical to those of the S3 under a buyback contract. However, the captain (retailer) will
seek a lower buyback price, i.e., a lower α , to achieve more profit.
For markdown-money contracts, the mathematical results again remain identical
to those in S3 under a markdown-money contract, that is, assuming m = α ( p − sR ) for

α ∈ [0,1] ,
*
*
and π R* = (1 − α )π MSC
,
w* = c + α ( p − c) , π M* =απ MSC

where

π MSC * = ( p − c) F −1 (

p −c
F −1 (
)
p−c
) − ( p − sR ) ∫ p − sR F ( x)dx .
0
p − sR

(2.7.4)
When

s R ≥ sM ,

the

markdown-money also achieves coordination. Note that in contrast to the wholesale-price
contract, the markdown-money contract not only complicates the transactions with an
additional pricing term, more importantly, this contract type concerns the supplier since
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he has to pay for unsold products that are invisible (to the supplier) and are salvaged by
the retailer, which can lead to implementing challenges in practice. In this sense, the
markdown-money contract is outperformed by the wholesale-price contract.
Proposition 2.7.1: In S6, the wholesale-price contract outperforms the markdown-money
contract for coordination when sR ≥ sM . A buyback contract can be used for
coordination if sM ≥ sR , and the retailer will decrease the buyback price to achieve more
profit.

2.7.3 Comparison: S4 versus S6
In S4, the captain (retailer) acts as the Stackelberg follower in determining the stock size,
which renders the supply chain coordinated in that the stocking quantity is the only
decision variable that affects coordination. In contrast, the retailer has to set the price(s)
to induce the supplier to choose a stocking quantity for coordination in S6.
In the case of a wholesale-price contract, the wholesale price will be negotiated
such that c<w<p holds in both S4 and S6. The buyback contract’s pricing terms in S4
and S6 are determined such that the wholesale price is independent of the buyback price
in S4, while the latter independence dose not hold in S6. Therefore, the retailer can seek a
high buyback price as well as a low wholesale price in S4. In contrast, the retailer has to
set a low buyback price that induces a low wholesale price to share a high supply chain
profit in S6. To summarize, S4 assures the retailer a higher degree of control for
coordination in comparison to S6.
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2.8 Structures S7 and S8
The supplier captains the supply chain and determines the quantity in both Structures S7
and S8. In S7, the supplier introduces a contract type first, the Stackelberg leader
(retailer) then chooses a pricing decision, and then the captain (supplier) commits a stock
level. To coordinate the supply chain, the supplier determines Q* = F −1 (( p − c ) /( p − sR ))
if sR ≥ sM , or Q* = F −1 (( p − c ) /( p − sM )) if sM ≥ sR , which are independent of the
contract’s pricing terms, while the price determination depends on the relative bargaining
power of the agents.
In S8, the supplier specifies a contract type, as well as a supply quantity at either
Q* = F −1 (( p − c ) /( p − sR ))

or

Q* = F −1 (( p − c ) /( p − sM )) .

Similar

to

S7,

the

determination of the pricing term(s) is based upon the agents’ bargaining power.
Even though Structures S7 and S8 have different Stackelberg hierarchies, the
supplier always chooses a stocking quantity that optimizes the supply chain, regardless of
his Stackelberg position. This observation is consistent with the statement in Stackelberg
(1934) that sometimes even the firms themselves do not know who is the leader and who
is the follower.
Proposition 2.8.1: In structures S7 and S8, a wholesale-price contract can be chosen to
coordinate the supply chain if the retailer has the salvage advantage, while a buyback
contract can be used for coordination when the supplier has the salvage advantage.

40

2.9 Structures S9 and S10
In Structures S9 and S10, the supply chain captain assumes the Stackelberg follower
position in choosing contracts’ pricing term(s). However, the profit functions of the
supply chain are independent of w, b, and m, see (2.4.3), (2.4.8), and (2.4.17). Therefore,
coordination cannot be induced by captain’s pricing decisions under any contract type in
this case. On the other hand, the agent who acts as the leader (the supplier in S9 and the
retailer in S10) to choose Q cannot expect what the follower’s reactions will be since the
follower’s objective profit function is independent of the pricing terms. To summarize,
S9 and S10 are infeasible structures.

2.10 Conclusions and Future Research
In this chapter, we relaxed the standard assumption in the literature that a supply chain
captain does also act as the Stackelberg leader. This allows us to investigate ten possible
supply chain decision structures in terms of coordination. In each decentralized decision
structure, we analyzed the effect of contract type, namely, the wholesale-price contract,
buyback contract, or markdown-money contract, and their role in achieving supply chain
coordination.
The use of a particular contract type to achieve coordination depends not only on
the agent having the overstock salvage advantage, but also upon the supply chain
decision hierarchy. For example, when the retailer captains the supply chain and acts as
the Stackelberg follower to determine the stocking level (S4), coordination can be
achieved using either a wholesale-price contract or a buyback contract.
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As for the supply chain captain, the Stackelberg leadership is not always
necessary for coordination and for seeking more profit. For example, the retailer captains
the supply chain in Structures S4, however, being the follower allows the retailer to have
the products with the lowest wholesale price using supplier-biddings.
In the case of a buyback contract, the general intuition is that a higher buyback
price leads to a higher wholesale price, thus assuring more profit for the supplier. In the
foregoing analysis, it is shown that the wholesale price is not necessarily a function of the
buyback price (as in the case of S4 and S7). Therefore, a retailer can seek a high buyback
price along with a low wholesale price, and a supplier may retain a low buyback price as
well as a low wholesale price.
In S3, the markdown-money contract has to be used for coordination when the
retailer has the salvage advantage; while in other decentralized structures, the wholesaleprice contract outperforms the markdown-money contract due to its easier implementary.
This conclusion partially explains why the markdown-money contract is uncommon in
practice.
Several extensions deserve further efforts. We assumed that the retail price is
exogenously determined in this chapter. It is also useful to consider how (or whether)
coordination can be achieved in different decision structures when the retail price is
endogenously determined. Agents are assumed risk neutral in our research. In contrast, if
either or both agents are risk averse, questions such as how can coordination be reached,
and how the profit is split within the supply chain, are worthy of further research.
Another noteworthy extension is the analysis on information structure. For instance,
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when private information exists, how both agents react in different structures will be an
interesting issue to explore.
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Chapter 3:
Supply Chain Performance with Power Imbalanced Suppliers

3.1 Introduction
We study a supply chain (or supply channel) where multiple suppliers/manufacturers
supply substitutable products or components to a common downstream firm or retailer.
Such multi-agent supply chains widely exist in manufacturing, retailing, and service
industries. Manufacturers seldom produce all parts by themselves, but outsource them to
upstream suppliers. For example, Dell and Hewlett Packard produce personal computers
with components supplied by a variety of upstream suppliers; General Motors and Ford
assemble vehicles but outsource most parts to numerous independent upstream firms.
Retailers such as Home-Depot, Best-Buy, and Wal-Mart, carry multiple brands in the
same product categories. In the service industry, for instance, Dutch bank ABN AMRO
in 2005 outsourced its IT operations to five providers with entire contracts valued at $
2.24 billion over five years (Gibson 2005).
In this chapter, we focus on the influence of each agent’s decision-making power
on the strategic interactions and performance within a multi-supplier-one-retailer supply
chain. Such interactions in a supply chain are typically modeled as either two-stage
Stackelberg games or one-stage non-cooperative games with all suppliers sharing an
equal or balanced decision-making power over/under the retailer (Choi 1991). That is, all
suppliers are assumed to act as either Stackelberg leaders or followers over the retailer, or
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all supply chain parties move simultaneously in decision-making. We relax this
conventional assumption to examine situations when suppliers have an unequal decisionmaking power over each other so that one or more suppliers can exercise Stackelberg
leadership over the other suppliers. This relaxation allows us to extend and generalize the
results of the multi-supplier-one-retailer power-balanced supply chain studied by Choi
(1991). As a result, five additional configurations for supply chains under power
imbalance are analyzed in this chapter by modeling them as either two-stage or threestage Bertrand Stackelberg games. This chapter focuses on such questions as supply
chain performance and stability, effects of product substitution, and strategies used by
agents with different decision-making power.
Choi (1991) examines a retailing channel consisting of two suppliers and one
retailer and analyzes three possible channel configurations with power balanced
suppliers; namely, the Manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) structure in which both suppliers
act as the Stackelberg leaders over the retailer, the Retailer Stackelberg (RS) structure
where the retailer assumes leadership with respect to power-balanced suppliers, and the
Vertical Nash (VN) structure in which all participants have equal decision-making power.
The above supplier balanced-power structures have also been empirically tested, for
instance see, Besanko et al. (1998) who use the VN model to validate price endogeneity,
or Sudhir (2001) who investigates vertical interactions within the context of MS and VN
structures.
Kadiyali et al. (2000) also study and empirically test interactions within a multisupplier-single channel using a somewhat generalized Choi’s power models, but the

45

supplier-supplier interactions are subsumed within the retailer’s interaction with each
supplier.
Besides Choi (1991)’s two-supplier-single-retailer case, channel interactions have
been studied in terms of the number of agents involved, for instance, for the case of one
supplier and one retailer, Jeuland and Shugan (1983) and Moorthy (1987) investigate
channel coordination mechanisms, Netessine and Rudi (2004) investigate drop-shipping
in terms of three power structures similar to Choi (1991). Given a channel with one
supplier and two retailers, Ingene and Parry (1995) consider supply chain coordination
with “quantity discounts” and “two-part tariff”. With two suppliers and two retailers,
McGuire and Staelin (1983) study agents’ pricing strategies under exclusive dealership
structures, and starting from that, Moothy (1988) answers the question “why strategic
interaction among suppliers makes it possible for decentralization to be a Nash
equilibrium strategy”; Choi (1996) and Trivedi (1998) both consider agents’ pricing
interactions when retailers carry products from both suppliers; Lee and Staelin (1997)
study the value of Stackelberg pricing leadership within the concept of vertical strategic
interaction under different channel structures.
However, in the cases of one-supplier-two-retailer or two-supplier-two-retailer
channels, to the best of our knowledge, the existing literature has not considered the
effect of power imbalance within the supplier or retailer groups.
On the other hand, multi-supplier-single-retailer supply chains have been studied
quite extensively in the context of complementary products being offered by different
suppliers. For instance, in assembly supply chains with a common assembler (retailer),
Gerchak and Wang (2004) assume all suppliers move simultaneously as either
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Stackelberg leaders or followers over the common assembler. They study supply chain
coordination and systems performance issues under contracts such as wholesale price,
buyback, or revenue sharing contracts, see Cachon (2003) and Lariviere (1999) for
excellent reviews on supply chain contracts. Granot and Yin (2004) study system
performance and supplier coalition under the assumption of suppliers having equal power
for two cases: first, suppliers move to set wholesale prices and the retailer follows by
setting the stock size; second, the retailer moves first in setting wholesale prices and
suppliers follow with stocking decisions who also retain the overstock risk. Wang (2005)
also studies system performance, but assumes the retailer serve as the Stackelberg leader
over the suppliers, and suppliers can move either simultaneously or sequentially in
pricing and production decisions; also see Jiang and Wang (2005). Bernstein and
DeCroix (2004) investigate multi-tier assembly systems in which the downstream firm(s)
holds higher decision-making power over the upstream agents, and all firms at the same
tier move simultaneously. Carr and Karmarkar (2005) and Corbett and Karmarkar (2001)
study competition within a multi-echelon assembly supply chain with a deterministic
demand assumption, where the former assumes a VN configuration while the latter
assumes a MS power structure.
In the preceding assembly systems models, production quantities at each echelon
remain the same as (or proportional to) the final assembly quantities. In contrast, in many
other situations, it is the common operational practice that downstream firms order
substitutable components from different upstream suppliers. Under product substitution,
however, modeling and characterizing multi-supplier-one-retailer supply chain in
stochastic environment turn out to be quite complex. Consequently, analysis of vertical
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interactions in such an environment is usually simplified via a one-supplier-one-retailer
newsvendor model; see, for instance, Cachon (2003) and Lariviere (1999).
In this chapter, we study a multi-supplier-one-retailer power-imbalanced supply
chain in which suppliers offer substitutable products. We assume a linear deterministic
demand function that captures the substitution effects (which is also a measure of product
competition). We obtain closed-form equilibrium results that facilitate insight on supply
chain performance under power imbalance and substitution effects. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first instance of a detailed analysis for such supply chains. In the
sequel, the following conclusions are reached in this chapter:
(1) With increasing product substitution, a multi-supplier-one-retailer supply chain can
achieve coordination asymptotically under a simple wholesale pricing mechanism.
(2) Each supplier’s profit consistently decreases when products become more
substitutable even if the suppliers dominate the retailer, whereas the retailer benefits
from a high degree of substitution regardless of the supply chain power structure.
(3) A “niche” supplier is not necessarily an underdog in the presence of a larger supplier
when seeking to increase the share of its supply chain profit under certain decision
power structures.
(4) In the case of multiple suppliers, “profit percentages” can characterize their relative
power differences more accurately than the respective “absolute profits”.
(5) Certain power-imbalanced channels are shown to dominate others. Moreover, we
show that Manufacturer Stackelberg and Retailer Stackelberg channels are no longer
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stable structures (as claimed in Choi, 1991) when suppliers are able to behave as if
they are power imbalanced.
It is a common practice that a firm orders from power-imbalanced (or
asymmetric) multiple suppliers for satisfying its end demands for products and services,
and thus, such systems deserve in-depth investigation. For example, a PC assembler such
as Dell or Hewlett Packard use CPUs from different suppliers, but Intel dominates the
CPU supplier market. Wal-Mart offers customers national-brand beverages such as Pepsi
and Coca-Cola along with beverages supplied by niche players. IBM Global services
pockets $1.87 billions from Dutch bank ABN AMRO’s $2.24 billion IT outsourcing
contracts, and the four other IT service providers share the remaining outsourcing budget.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the
model and relevant assumptions along with different supply chain structures; Section 3
provides derivations and closed-form equilibrium results under power-imbalance;
detailed comparisons of different supply chain structures are presented in Section 4.
Section 5 focuses on supply chain performance as well as channel structure stability.
Section 6 concludes the chapter. The required notation is introduced as it becomes
necessary.

3.2 The Model and Decision Hierarchies
Consider a supply chain where one retailer carries substitutable products from two
suppliers (supplier 1 and supplier 2) in a single business season. Suppose the two
suppliers are asymmetric in size and assume that Supplier 1 is larger than supplier 2. This
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size difference affects the Stackelberg pricing positions that suppliers can have, as
illustrated next. The supplier i is paid a wholesale unit price wi by the retailer who in turn
charges a retail price pi from the end customers, where the supplier index i (= 1,2)
denotes the specific supplier, and thus the specific product i sold to the retailer.
Consider the linear deterministic function for retailer demand given by,
qi = ai − bpi + t ( p j − pi ) , i, j=1,2, i≠j,

(3.2.1)

where the coefficient ai (> 0) represents the product “market base” (see Tsay and
Agrawal, 2000) that is invariant to the retail prices, b ( > 0) represents product i’s demand
sensitivity on its own retail price, and t (≥ 0) denotes the degree of product substitution,
which accounts for the effect of retail price differences of the two substitutable products.
Note that a unit price discount offered by both suppliers simultaneously thus results in
both demands q1 and q2 increasing by b units. In the sequel, (3.2.1) is normalized by
setting b=1 to simplify the presentation. Observe that t = 0 represents the case when the
two products are completely independent, and as t increases, the degree of product
substitution (hence, the competition between the two products) increases.
Demand models similar to that in (3.2.1) have been used by Choi (1996),
McGuire and Staelin (1983), Trivedi (1998), Tsay and Agrawal (2000), for instance. It
must be noted that Choi’s (1991) demand function, namely, qi = a − bpi + tp j has resulted
in the counter-intuitive implication that equilibrium retail prices grow when products
become more substitutable in the structures analyzed by the author. The demand-price
relationship on (3.2.1), in contrast, can be shown to eliminate such implications.
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We shall use the following notation: π M i is supplier (manufacturer) i’s profit, π R
is the retailer’s total profit in selling both product types, π SC i is the total supply chain
(SC) profits generated due to (only) product i, and π I is the total SC profits due to both
product types. Denoting the unit production costs by ci , wholesale prices by wi , and
assuming the stock size to be equal to the (deterministic) demand, the following
expressions hold:

π Mi = ( wi − ci )qi
2

(3.2.2)

π R = ∑ ( pi − wi )qi

(3.2.3)

π SC i = ( pi − ci )qi

(3.2.4)

i =1

2

π I = ∑ π SC i .

(3.2.5)

i =1

Furthermore, it is assumed that information is symmetric across the supply chain,
and each supply chain agent makes decisions to maximize his/her own profit.

3.2.1 Supply Chain Structure
Given the information symmetry in the supply chain, the chronological order in which
each agent is making pricing decisions impacts the relative profit potential of each agent.
Such a chronology in the decision hierarchy is often the result of the relative power that
each agent holds in the supply chain. Accordingly, for the two-supplier-one-retailer
supply chain, eight possible relative power configurations can be proposed, as depicted in
Figure 3.1, where M1 and M2 denote the suppliers 1 and 2, respectively, and R denotes
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Figure 3.1 Supply Chain Decision Hierarchies
the retailer. If M1 holds more (bargaining) power than M2 in the supply chain, it is
represented by M1 → M2 in Figure 3.1. M1 ↔ M2 indicates that M1 and M2 both have
equal decision-making power. The eight distinct structures are marked (S1) through (S8).
Note that the structures (S1), (S2), and (S3) correspond to both suppliers having
equal power, which is the case considered in Choi (1991). In this case, both suppliers
move simultaneously over each other in making decisions. (S1) is representative of two
large suppliers with equal power supplying to a small retailer, whereas (S2) illustrates the
retailer being relatively larger compared to two equally-sized suppliers. (S3) is concerned
with the case when all three agents share an equal decision-making power such that no
one can gain pricing leadership over the others. (S1), (S2), and (S3) are appropriately
termed Manufacturer Stackelberg (MS), Retailer Stackelberg (RS), and Vertical Nash
(VN), respectively. Choi (1991) offers in-depth discussions, including the existence of
unique Nash equilibria for these three relative power structures.
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In contrast, structures (S4) through (S8) underscore the presence of power
imbalance between the suppliers. For example, when a very large retailer such as WalMart selling beverages provided by a large supplier such as Coca-Cola or Pepsi, along
with beverages produced by smaller niche suppliers, the retailing supply chain power
structure typically resembles that in (S4). On the other hand, in (S5), supplier 1 has power
over a mid-sized retailer who carries products from both his and of another relatively
smaller supplier that has relatively less power than the retailer in the supply chain.
Structure (S6) models a situation when both suppliers are more powerful than the retailer
along with the relatively larger supplier M1 further dominating the supplier M2. We offer
three-stage Bertrand Stackelberg game-theoretic analyses of these structures.
On the other hand, Structures (S7) and (S8) have only two decision tiers and they
can be modeled as two-stage games. Unlike (S1) and (S2) where the two suppliers are
power-balanced, in (S7) and (S8), the retailer shares equal power with one supplier. In
(S7), Retailer has balanced power with the supplier 1 and they both act as Stackelberg
leaders over Supplier 2, whereas in (S8), the retailer has balanced power with Supplier 2
and they both play the role of Stackelberg followers in the supply chain.
In the ensuing analyses, the following terminology will be applied: the member
with the highest hierarchy in decision making, i.e., the agent who moves first, is termed
the Stackelberg leader, while the member with the lowest hierarchy, i.e., moving last, is
termed the Stackelberg follower. When there exists an intermediate decision maker, as in
the case of (S4), (S5), and (S6), such an agent is termed a Stackelberg middler.
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3.3 Equilibrium Analysis of Supply Chain Structures
Let us first consider the structure (S4) where the retailer is the leader, the supplier 1 is a
middler and the supplier 2 is a follower. The retailer chooses the retail margins m1 and m2
at the first stage of decision making by taking both suppliers’ reaction functions into
account, where m1=p1-w1 and m2=p2-w2; at the second stage of decision making, the
middler M1 chooses a wholesale price w1 that is conditional on the retail margin m1, as
well as by taking into account of M2’s reaction function; finally, at the third stage, the
follower M2’s wholesale price is conditioned on both decisions m2 and p1, where
p1=w1+m1. Using backward induction, M2’s reaction function π M* 2 is obtained as

π M* 2 ( p1 , m2 ) := max{ π M 2 ( p1 , p2 , m2 ) : p2 − w2 = m2 } ,
w2

(3.3.1)

where

π M 2 ( p1 , p2 , m2 ) = ( w2 − c2 )q2 = ( w2 − c2 )[a2 − p2 + t ( p1 − p2 )]

(3.3.2)

under the demand function in (3.2.1), normalized with b = 1. By expressing π M 2 as a
function of the single decision variable w2 , (3.3.1) is a univariate unconstrained concave
maximization problem. The first order optimality condition, i.e., setting the derivative to
zero, yields a2 + tp1 + (t + 1)(c2 − m2 − 2w2 ) = 0, and thus, supplier 2’s optimal prices are
w2* = [ a2 + tp1 + (t + 1)(c2 − m2 )] /[2(t +1)] and p2* = w2* + m2 .

(3.3.3)

Substituting (3.3.3) in the supplier 1’s (middler’s) problem, and given the retail margin
m1, the supplier 1’s profit π M* 1 is determined by solving

π M* 1 ( p2* , m1 ) := max{π M 1 ( p1 , p2* , m1 ) : p1 − w1 = m1 },
w1
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(3.3.4)

where

π M 1 ( p1 , p2* , m1 ) = ( w1 − c1 )q1 = ( w1 − c1 )[a1 − p1 + t ( p2* − p1 )].

(3.3.5)

Supplier 1’s problem in (3.3.4) is also a concave univariate maximization problem, and
thus, the first order condition of optimality yields
w1* = [ta2 + 2(t + 1) a1 + (t 2 + t )(m2 + c2 ) + (t 2 + 4t + 2)(c1 − m1 )] /[2(t 2 + 4t + 2)] .

(3.3.6)

Given both suppliers’ reaction functions w1* and w2* in (3.3.3) and (3.3.6), respectively,
the retailer’s profit objective, π R (m1 , m2 , p1* , p2* ) for p1* = w1* + m1 and p2* = w2* + m2 , is
jointly concave in (m1, m2) since the Hessian matrix is negative-definite as evident by
∂ 2π R / ∂m12 < 0 , ∂ 2π R / ∂m22 < 0 , and

∂ 2π R
∂m12

∂ 2π R
∂m1∂m2

∂ 2π R
∂m1∂m2

∂ 2π R
∂m22

−
=

t 2 + 4t + 2
2(t + 1)
t/2

t/2
(t + 1)(t 2 + 8t + 4)
−
2(t 2 + 4t + 2)

= 2t + 1 > 0 .

(3.3.7)

Therefore, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium.
The optimized retail margins ( m1* , m2* ) are determined from the retailer’s first
order conditions, i.e., by setting the gradient vector of π R to zero, which yields
m1* =

a1 (t + 1) + a2t − c1 (2t + 1)
,
2(2t + 1)

(3.3.8)

m2* =

a2 (t + 1) + a1t − c2 (2t + 1)
.
2(2t + 1)

(3.3.9)

Using forward substitution, optimal wholesale prices in (3.3.3) and (3.3.6) are then
obtained as
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w1* =

w2* =

(3t 2 + 12t + 6)c1 + (t 2 + t )c2 + ta2 + 2(t + 1)a1
,
4(t 2 + 4t + 2)

(3.3.10)

(t 3 + 4t 2 + 2t )c1 + (2t 2 + 2t )a1 + (3t 2 + 8t + 4)a2 + (7t 3 + 31t 2 + 36t + 12)c2
. (3.3.11)
8(t + 1)(t 2 + 4t + 2)

3.3.1 Analysis of Structure (S4)

Note that the demand parameter ai reflects customer brand loyalty and market share, and
a larger supplier in general has a larger market base over small suppliers. Meanwhile, a
larger supplier in general has a smaller unit production cost ci due to possible economies
of scale. The equilibrium results in (3.3.8)-(3.3.11) capture not only the effect of power
imbalance in Structure (S4), but also effects due to brand loyalty as well as economies of
scale in production. In order to better understand the effects due to power imbalance
alone, we suppress these other effects by setting a1 = a2 = a and c1 = c2 = c for the
remainder of this section. In this case, the equilibrium results are simplified as
m1* = m2* = ( a − c ) / 2 1 ,

w1* =

(3.3.12)

(3t + 2)a + (4t 2 + 13t + 6)c
(5t 2 + 10t + 4)a + (8t 3 + 35t 2 + 38t + 12)c
*
w
=
,
, (3.3.13)
2
4(t 2 + 4t + 2)
8(t + 1)(t 2 + 4t + 2)

(2t 2 + 11t + 6)a + (2t 2 + 5t + 2)c
(2t 2 + 11t + 6)a + (2t 2 + 5t + 2)c
*
p =
, p2 =
, (3.3.14)
4(t 2 + 4t + 2)
4(t 2 + 4t + 2)
*
1

q1* =

(3t + 2)(a − c) * (5t 2 + 10t + 4)(a − c)
, q2 =
,
8(t 2 + 4t + 2)
8(t + 1)

1

(3.3.15)

Note that it may mislead the reader that the retail margins are equal to half of the difference between the
market base and production cost. This is due to the normalization that b=1 was set as mentioned earlier, for
if not, margins are m1 = m2 = ( a − bc) / 2b .
*

*
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π M* 1 =

(3t + 2) 2 (a − c)2
(5t 2 + 10t + 4) 2 (a − c)2
*
π
=
,
,
M2
32(t + 1)(t 2 + 4t + 2)
64(t + 1)(t 2 + 4t + 2) 2

(3.3.16)

(8t 3 + 29t 2 + 28t + 8)(a − c) 2
,
16(t + 1)(t 2 + 4t + 2)

(3.3.17)

π R* =
*
π SC
=

(32t 5 + 287t 4 + 836t 3 + 992t 2 + 512t + 96)(a − c) 2
,
64(t + 1)(t 2 + 4t + 2) 2

(3.3.18)

where a > c is necessary to ensure non-negative production quantities in (3.3.15). Also,
it follows that the retailer charges the same retail margin m1* = m2* = ( a − c ) / 2 from both
suppliers in (S4). The following proposition establishes the qualitative aspects of the
equilibrium behavior, where the “integrated system” refers to the two-supplier-singleretailer supply chain being controlled by a single agent (i.e., a coordinated supply chain).
Proposition 3.1: In structure (S4),

(1) Both suppliers’ retail prices monotonically decrease in t and they reach the
integrated system’s retail prices as t → ∞.
(2) Both wholesale prices monotonically decrease in t and they reach the respective
unit production cost as t → ∞.
(3) Both product quantities increase in t.
(4) Both suppliers’ profits monotonically decrease in t and they vanish
asymptotically.
(5) The retailer’s profit monotonically increases in t and it reaches the total supply
chain profit as t → ∞.
(6) The total supply chain profits increase in t and converges to the integrated
system profit as t → ∞.
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Proof. It can be shown that

dp1*
(3t 2 + 4t + 2)(a − c)
dp2*
(5t 4 + 20t 3 + 32t 2 + 20t + 4)(a − c)
=−
=−
< 0,
< 0. (3.3.19)
dt
4(t 2 + 4t + 2) 2
dt
8(t + 1) 2 (t 2 + 4t + 2)2
Similarly, dw1* / dt <0, dw2* / dt <0, dq1* / dt >0, dq2* / dt >0, d π M* 1 / dt <0, d π M* 2 / dt <0,
*
/ dt >0. Furthermore, if the optimal retail prices of a corresponding
d π R* / dt >0, and d π SC

integrated supply chain are denoted by p1(* I ) and p2(* I ) for the two products, then it can be
shown that p1(* I ) = p2(* I ) = (a + c) / 2 , and lim p1* = p1(* I ) and lim p2* = p2(* I ) . As a result, the
t →∞

t →∞

decentralized structure (S4) resembles an integrated system when the two products are
perfectly substitutable, i.e., t → ∞ , and lim π M* 1 = lim π M* 2 = 0 , with the retailer capturing
t →∞

t →∞

the entire supply chain profit. 
It can be further shown that

and

d 2 p1* (3t 3 + 6t 2 + 6t + 4)(a − c)
=
> 0,
dt 2
2(t 2 + 4t + 2)3

(3.3.20)

d 2 p2* (5t 6 + 30t 5 + 84t 4 + 130t 3 + 102t 2 + 36t + 4)(a − c)
=
> 0,
dt 2
4(t + 1)3 (t 2 + 4t + 2)3

(3.3.21)

and thus, p1* and p2* are convex (and decreasing) in t. Therefore, at lower levels of t, a
change of substitution drastically affects the retail prices, consequently, the profits of
each supply chain agent changes substantially. In contrast, at relatively higher levels of t,
a change of substitution has far less impact on the retail prices and the profits of each
agent.
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Considering the retailer profit π R* as the combination of profits π R* 1 (of product
type 1) and π R* 2 (of product type 2), and thus π R* = π R* 1 + π R* 2 , it can be shown that

π R* 2 > π R* 1 > π M* 2 > π M* 1 for all t > 0 . When the two products are completely unsubstitutable, i.e., t = 0 , we have π R* 2 = π R* 1 > π M* 2 = π M* 1 . That the Stackelberg middler M1
achieves a lower profit than the (less powerful) follower M2 results from the fact that the
retailer charges the same retail margin from both suppliers, whereas M2 charges lower
wholesale unit price than M1 does, which in turn, leads to a lower retail price and thus a
higher stock quantity for M2 products so as to offset the loss of lower wholesale price.
*
denote the optimized profits generated from supplier i’s product, where
Let π SCi

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
π SC
1 = π M 1 + π R1 and π SC 2 = π M 2 + π R 2 . Thus, π Mi / π SCi represents the profit percentage

that the supplier i achieves from his own products. It follows that

π

*
SC1

−π

*
SC 2

t 2 (8t 3 + 43t 2 + 36t + 8)(a − c) 2
=−
≤0,
64(t + 1)(t 2 + 4t + 2)2

*
*
*
π M* 1 / π SC
1 − π M 2 / π SC 2 =

2t 2 (t 2 + 4t + 2)
≥ 0.
(2t 2 + 11t + 6)(4t 3 + 25t 2 + 34t + 12)

(3.3.22)

(3.3.23)

Thus, the profit contribution from M1 products to the supply chain is less than that of M2
products; however, the ratio of profit that supplier M1 shares from the sale of his own
products is larger that that of M2, as stated below.
Proposition 3.2: The supplier power imbalance that exists in (S4) allows the more

powerful supplier to obtain a higher “profit percentage” from his products, in
comparison to what the small (less powerful) supplier is able to, at all levels of product
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substitution. However, the total dollar profit in the supply chain due to the small
supplier’s products dominates that of the large supplier.

3.4 Analysis of Remaining Structures

Equilibrium analyses of all structures in Figure 3.1 can be performed analogously to that
of (S4), presented in the preceding section. The resulting optimal solutions, along with
those of the integrated supply chain (coordinated by one agent), are summarized in
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 in the end of this chapter, where c is set to be 0 for ease of exposition.
In the remainder of this section, properties of these structures are investigated.
3.4.1 Properties of Retail Prices and Retail Margins

Retail prices follow the results in Proposition 3.1 in all eight structures, the proof of
which follows analogously by referring to Table 3.1:
Proposition 3.3: In structures (S1) through (S8), equilibrium retail prices of both

products decrease monotonically in t; moreover, they coincide with the corresponding
integrated supply chain’s retail prices as products become completely substitutable, i.e.,
as t → ∞.
It follows that when products are completely un-substitutable, i.e., t = 0, retail prices of
both product types are higher in all structures (S1)-(S8) compared to those of an
integrated supply chain, see Table 3.1. Let the subscript n = 1,2,...,8, represent the
particular structure under consideration, and let n = 0 represent the case of the integrated
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Table 3.1: Equilibrium Wholesale Prices, Retail Margins, and Retail Prices
w1*

w2*

m1*

m2*

S0 N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

S1

a
t+2
a
2(t + 2)
a
2t + 3
a (3t + 2)
4(t 2 + 4t + 2)

a
t+2
a
2(t + 2)
a
2t + 3
a(5t 2 + 10t + 4)
8(t + 1)(t 2 + 4t + 2)

a(t + 1)
2(t + 2)
a
2
a (t + 1)
2t + 3
a
2

S5

a (3t + 2)
2(t 2 + 4t + 2)

a(5t 2 + 10t + 4)
8(t + 1)(t 2 + 4t + 2)

S6

a (3t + 2)
2(t 2 + 4t + 2)

S7

a (3t + 2)
3(t 2 + 4t + 2)

S2
S3
S4

a (4t + 3)
2(2t 2 + 6t + 3)

p1*

a(t + 1)
2(t + 2)
a
2
a (t + 1)
2t + 3
a
2

a
2
a(t + 3)
2(t + 2)
a(t + 3)
2(t + 2)
a (t + 2)
2t + 3
a(2t 2 + 11t + 6)
4(t 2 + 4t + 2)

a
2
a(t + 3)
2(t + 2)
a(t + 3)
2(t + 2)
a (t + 2)
2t + 3
a(4t 3 + 25t 2 + 34t + 12)
8(t + 1)(t 2 + 4t + 2)

a (t + 2)(2t + 1)
4(t 2 + 4t + 2)

a
2

a(2t 2 + 11t + 6)
4(t 2 + 4t + 2)

a(4t 3 + 25t 2 + 34t + 12)
8(t + 1)(t 2 + 4t + 2)

a(5t 2 + 10t + 4)
4(t + 1)(t 2 + 4t + 2)

a (t + 2)(2t + 1)
4(t 2 + 4t + 2)

a(2t 2 + 11t + 6)
4(t 2 + 4t + 2)

a(4t 3 + 25t 2 + 34t + 12)
8(t + 1)(t 2 + 4t + 2)

a (3t 2 + 7t + 3)
6(t + 1)(t 2 + 4t + 2)

a(3t 2 + 9t + 4)
6(t 2 + 4t + 2)
a (2t + 1)(2t + 3)
4(2t 2 + 6t + 3)

a(4t 3 + 15t 2 + 14t + 4)
8(t + 1)(t 2 + 4t + 2)
a
2

a(3t 2 + 15t + 8)
6(t 2 + 4t + 2)

a (3t 3 + 18t 2 + 25t + 9)
6(t + 1)(t 2 + 4t + 2)

a(8t 2 + 15t + 6)
a(12t 3 + 40t 2 + 39t + 12) a (4t 2 + 16t + 9)
6(t + 1)(2t 2 + 6t + 3)
12(t + 1)(2t 2 + 6t + 3)
4(2t 2 + 6t + 3)
Note: (1) S0 represents the integrated system, S1-S8 represent Structures 1 to 8, respectively;
S8

p2*

a(12t 3 + 56t 2 + 69t + 24)
12(t + 1)(2t 2 + 6t + 3)

(2) Subscripts 1 & 2 for prices and production quantities correspond to supplier 1 and 2 products, respectively.
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Table 3.2 Equilibrium Stock Quantities and Profits
q1*

q2*

π M* 1

π M* 2

π R*

a/2
a(t + 1)[2(t + 2)]−1
a(t + 1)
2(t + 2)
a (t + 1)
2t + 3
a(3t + 2)
8(t + 1)

Ø
a/2
−1
a (t + 1)[2(t + 2)]
a 2 (t + 1) /[2(t + 2) 2 ]
a(t + 1)
a 2 (t + 1) /[4(t + 2) 2 ]
2(t + 2)
a (t + 1)
a 2 (t + 1) /[(2t + 3) 2 ]
2t + 3
a (5t 2 + 10t + 4)
a 2 (3t + 2) 2
8(t 2 + 4t + 2)
32(t + 1)(t 2 + 4t + 2)

Ø
a 2 (t + 1) /[2(t + 2) 2 ]

Ø
a 2 (t + 1) 2 /[2(t + 2) 2 ]

a 2 (t + 1) /[4(t + 2) 2 ]

a 2 (t + 1) /[2(t + 2)]

a 2 (t + 1) /[(2t + 3) 2 ]

2a 2 (t + 1) 2 /[(2t + 3) 2 ]

a 2 (5t 2 + 10t + 4) 2
64(t + 1)(t 2 + 4t + 2)2

a 2 (8t 3 + 29t 2 + 28t + 8)
16(t + 1)(t 2 + 4t + 2)

S5

a(3t + 2)
8(t + 1)

a (5t 2 + 10t + 4)
8(t 2 + 4t + 2)

a 2 (3t + 2)2
16(t + 1)(t 2 + 4t + 2)

a 2 (5t 2 + 10t + 4) 2
64(t + 1)(t 2 + 4t + 2)2

a 2 (16t 3 + 49t 2 + 44t + 12)
32(t + 1)(t 2 + 4t + 2)

S6

a(3t + 2)
8(t + 1)

a (5t 2 + 10t + 4)
8(t 2 + 4t + 2)

a 2 (3t + 2)2
16(t + 1)(t 2 + 4t + 2)

a 2 (5t 2 + 10t + 4) 2
32(t + 1)(t 2 + 4t + 2) 2

⎛ 32t 5 + 201t 4 + 444t 3 ⎞
a ⎜⎜
⎟⎟
2
⎝ + 432t + 192t + 32 ⎠
64(t + 1)(t 2 + 4t + 2) 2

S7

a(3t + 2)
6(t + 1)

a (3t 2 + 7t + 3)
6(t 2 + 4t + 2)

a 2 (3t + 2)2
18(t + 1)(t 2 + 4t + 2)

a 2 (3t 2 + 7t + 3) 2
36(t + 1)(t 2 + 4t + 2) 2

a 2 (18t 3 + 63t 2 + 60t + 17)
36(t + 1)(t 2 + 4t + 2)

S8

a(4t + 3)
12(t + 1)

a(8t 2 + 15t + 6)
6(2t 2 + 6t + 3)

a 2 (4t + 3) 2
24(t + 1)(2t 2 + 6t + 3)

a 2 (8t 2 + 15t + 6) 2
36(t + 1)(2t 2 + 6t + 3)2

⎛ 288t 5 + 1552t 4 + 3120t 3 ⎞
a ⎜⎜
⎟⎟
2
⎝ + 2940t + 1314t + 225 ⎠
144(t + 1)(2t 2 + 6t + 3) 2

S0
S1
S2
S3
S4

*
*
Note: The total supply chain profits, π SC
= π M* 1 + π M* 2 + π R* . For S0, π SC
= a/ 2.
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2

2

supply chain. Thus, optimal retail price pni* and retail margin mni* refer to supplier i’s
( i = 1,2 ) products under structure (Sn). The following properties hold for 0 ≤ t < ∞ :
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
p41
= p51
= p61
≥ p11* = p21
≥ p81
> p71
≥ p31
> p01

(3.4.1)

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
p42
= p52
= p62
> p12* = p22
≥ p72
> p82
≥ p32
> p02

(3.4.2)

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
m21
= m41
> m31
≥ m71
> m81
≥ m11* ≥ m51
= m61

(3.4.3)

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
,
m22
= m42
= m52
= m72
> m32
≥ m82
> m12* ≥ m62

(3.4.4)

where equality in “≥” holds only when t = 0 .
(3.4.1) and (3.4.2) indicate that all three-tier power structures lead to the same
highest retail prices for both products, while the supplier power-balanced two-tier
structures (S1) and (S2) have the same second highest retail prices for both suppliers. In
contrast, when the three agents are power balanced, i.e., (S3), retail prices are the lowest.
Structures (S7) and (S8), where the two suppliers are power-imbalanced, the supplier
having the same power level as the retailer obtains the lower retail price.
Interestingly, whenever the retailer has power advantage over a supplier, she will
charge the same highest retail margin (i.e., a/2) while those suppliers that dominate (or
power-balanced with) the retailer will be charged less than a/2. This is evident in results
for structures (S2), (S4), (S5), and (S7).
When the two suppliers are power imbalanced, i.e., structures (S4)-(S8), as
follows from Table 3.1,
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
, p51
, p61
, p71
, and p81
p41
≥ p42
≥ p52
≥ p62
< p72
> p82

(3.4.5)

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
, m51
, m61
, m71
, and m81
.
m41
= m42
< m52
≤ m62
< m72
< m82

(3.4.6)
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Thus, the more powerful supplier’s products command a higher retail price than those of
the weaker supplier in all of the imbalanced structures except (S7), where the retailer and
supplier 1 equally dominate supplier 2. In terms of retail margins, the retailer charges
higher margins from supplier 2 than from supplier 1 unanimously, except in (S4) where
the retailer acts as the leader of both suppliers and charges the same margin.

3.4.2 Wholesale Prices and Order Quantities

Similar to the analysis of (S4) in Section 3.3, it can be shown that the wholesale prices
decrease in t for all eight structures.
Proposition 3.4: In structures (S1)-(S8), both suppliers’ wholesale prices monotonically

decrease in t and they are asymptotic to the production costs as products approach
perfect substitution, i.e., t → ∞.
For each power-imbalanced structure, for 0 ≤ t < ∞ ,
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
, w51
, w61
, w71
, and w81
,
w41
≥ w42
≥ w52
≥ w62
> w72
> w82

(3.4.7)

where equality in “≥” holds when t = 0. That is, the more powerful supplier charges a
higher wholesale price in all structures where suppliers are power imbalanced. However,
the order quantities have the following property:
Proposition 3.5: In structures (S1)-(S8), both suppliers’ production quantities

monotonically increase in t.
Under an integrated system, the optimal order quantity is a/2 for each product
type. For the eight structures of the supply chain in Figure 3.1, it can be shown that as
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product substitution becomes perfect ( t → ∞ ), only in (S1), (S2), (S3), and (S7) that the
optimal quantity reaches a/2 for each product type. However, for all remaining structures
(S4), (S5), (S6), and (S8), supplier 1 obtains a lower order quantity (while supplier 2
obtains a higher order quantity) than a/2 under perfect product substitution. In the case of
independent products, i.e., t = 0 , all eight structures result in order quantities smaller
than a/2 for either product type.
Furthermore, for 0 ≤ t < ∞ , it turns out that the order quantities when suppliers
are power imbalanced follow the relations
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
, q51
, q61
, q71
, and q81
.
q41
≤ q42
≤ q52
≤ q62
> q72
< q82

(3.4.8)

The equality of “ ≤ ” in (3.4.8) holds only when t = 0. Note that supplier 2 delivers more
quantity than supplier 1 in all of the imbalanced structures, except (S7) where the more
powerful supplier is power balanced with the retailer, formally stated as:
Proposition 3.6: When two power-imbalanced suppliers sell through a common retailer,

the small supplier captures more market share (more products sold) than the large
supplier except when the larger supplier is power balanced with the retailer.

3.5 Supply Chain Performance Analysis

In this section, we focus on how the supply chain profits are allocated by agent type or
the product type under different power-imbalanced SC decision hierarchies. We employ
both absolute, as well as relative, dollar profits allocations. The following result holds for
absolute dollar profits.
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Proposition 3.7: Both suppliers’ profits monotonically decrease, while the retailer’s

profit increases as the degree of product substitution t increases. Moreover, the total
supply chain profit monotonically increases in t. When the two products are completely
substitutable, i.e., t → ∞, the retailer captures the entire supply chain profit, which thus
coincides with the case of an integrated supply chain coordinated by the retailer.
Proof. Using the equilibrium results in Table 3.2, these results can be proven in a
straightforward manner. 
The above result is consistent with those in Propositions 3.3 and 3.4, where both
the retail prices and wholesale prices decrease in product substitution t in either product
type. Proposition 3.7 explains why it is a common practice for a retailer to carry products
from competitive suppliers regardless of her power position. By carrying multiple
products from the same category to spur competition, the retailer improves her own
profits, as well as the entire supply chain profits. When markets are highly competitive
(hence t is sufficiently large), being a retailer proves to be more profitable than being a
supplier, which thus justifies why large suppliers open retail outlets in addition to selling
through external retailers.
3.5.1 Supply Chain Structure Dominance

Given the relative profit potential of each agent in different SC structures, we focus on
whether certain decision structures can emerge dominant over the others. Identifying such
dominating structures helps developing insight as to their economic stability. To this end,
we define a certain weak form of dominance, termed PSD-criterion, or power
sacrifice/splitting dominance, when agents are allowed to reconfigure themselves so as to
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make a transition from one structure to another. “Power-sacrifice” refers to the case when
an agent willingly moves to a lower tier, and “power-splitting” refers to an agent having a
power-sharing agent who moves to a lower tier. In a structure transition, agents are
allowed to move only towards a lower-tier direction. For instance, when (S7) emerges in
a transition from (S8), M2 is subject to “power-sacrifice”, the retailer R is subject to
“power-splitting”, and M1 is subject to a “power-sacrifice”.
Definition 3.1 (Dominance): The structure (Sk) is said to PSD dominate structure (Sj),

denoted by (Sk) ≻ (Sj), if and only if every agent who is subject to “power-sacrifice” or
“power-splitting” in the transition from (Sj) to (Sk) is better-off in structure (Sk)
compared to structure (Sj), for j , k = 1,...,8.
In applying the PSD criterion, an agent is assumed “better-off” if his/her profit increases.
Thus, in the previous example of structure transition from (S8) to (S7), all three agents
must be better off in (S7) compared to (S8) in order for (S7) ≻ (S8) to hold. Notice that
PSD may also be applied under different metrics such as relative profit or percentage
supply chain profit allocation. However, the focus here is on absolute profits.
Furthermore, we define a structure to be stable as follows:
Definition 3.2 (Stability): Structure (Sk) is said to be a “stable structure” if and only if

(Sj) ⊁ (Sk), j = 1,...,8, j ≠ k .
The complete set of PSD dominance relationships as well as stability results are
presented in the following theorem.
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Theorem 3.1:

i)

(S6) ≻ (S1) for 0 ≤ t < ∞ , and (Sj) ⊁ (S1), j ≠ 6, for t ≥ 0. Moreover, (S6) ⊁ (Sj),
j ≠ 1, for all t ≥ 0.

ii) (S4) ≻ (S2) for 0 ≤ t < ∞ , and (Sj) ⊁ (S2), j ≠ 4, for t ≥ 0. Moreover, (S4) ⊁ (Sj),
j ≠ 2, for all t ≥ 0.
iii) (S3) ≻ (S4) for 1.47 ≤ t ≤ 11.59 , and (Sj) ⊁ (S4), j ≠ 3, for t ≥ 0. Also, (S3) ⊁ (Sj),
j ≠ 4, for all t ≥ 0.
iv) (S8) ≻ (S5) for t > 0.92 , and (Sj) ⊁ (S5), j ≠ 8, for t ≥ 0. Moreover, (S8) ⊁ (Sj),
j ≠ 5, for all t ≥ 0.
v)

Structures (S3), (S6), (S7), and (S8) are stable for 0 ≤ t < ∞ ; structure (S4) is stable
for t ∉ [1.47,11.59] ; moreover, structure (S5) is stable for 0 ≤ t < 0.92 .

Proof. (i): Transition (S1)→(S6) involves M1 subject to power-splitting and M2 subject
to power-sacrifice, and both M1 and M2 are better off in this transition, for 0 ≤ t < ∞ ,
and thus, (S6) ≻ (S1) holds. Furthermore, the transition (S1)→(Sj), j ≠ 6, ∀ t, cannot
assure that all involved agents are better off, and thus, (Sj) ⊁ (S1), j ≠ 6, ∀ t. Similarly,
transition (Sj)→(S6), j ≠ 1, ∀ t, cannot assure that all involved agents are better off,
which implies (S6) ⊁ (Sj), j ≠ 1, ∀ t.
Claims (ii), (iii), and (iv) can be proven analogously.
For claim (v), any transition from structures (S3), (S6), (S7), or (S8) to other
structures cannot assure all agents with power-sacrifice and/or power-splitting are better
off, and thus, these structures remain stable for 0 ≤ t < ∞ . As shown in (iii), (S3) PSD68

dominates (S4) for 1.47 ≤ t ≤ 11.59 , while no other structure PSD-dominates (S4).
Therefore, structure (S4) is stable for t ∉ [1.47,11.59] . Using (iv), it also follows that (S5)
is stable for 0 ≤ t ≤ 0.92 . 

When suppliers are power-balanced as in (S1) or (S2), it is more profitable for the
suppliers to re-align themselves as if they are power-imbalanced (S6 or S4, respectively)
since (S6) ≻ (S1) and (S4) ≻ (S2), see Theorem 1, i.e., (S1) and (S2) are not stable
structures. This finding is consistent with the empirical studies, for instance, Kadiyali et
al. (2000), where the authors claim that there is difficulty in supporting the existence of
SC structures (S1) and (S2) when real-world data is used.
According to Theorem 3.1, (S4) is stable only for sufficiently low levels or high
levels of product substitution, while (S5) is stable only when t is sufficiently small. Thus,
it appears that as product competition intensifies under (S4), the retailer and the powerful
supplier are better off by moving to (S3); however, if the competition is allowed to
escalate to sufficiently high levels (i.e., t > 11.59 ), the stronger supplier will become
worse off compared to staying under (S4). Considering (S4) ≻ (S2) for t > 0 , and since
(S3) ≻ (S4) for t ∈ [1.47,11.59] , it can be concluded that for relatively fair competition, a
dominant retailer (as in S2) would be willing to let the power advantage vanish and share
equal power with both suppliers as in (S3).

69

3.5.2 Supply Chain Profit Allocation

As it develops, the more powerful agent may not make the most profit in the case of a
power imbalanced supply chain. Figure 3.2 depicts the case for the two suppliers, where
the relative profit allocation is plotted against the product substitution (competition) over
different structures. It is evident that the two suppliers achieve supply chain profit quite
unevenly. Notably, the weaker supplier reaps more profit in structures (S4) and (S6) for
t > 0, and in (S8) for t > t * (= 3 / 8 ). Only in (S5), (S7), or in (S8) under sufficiently low

levels of substitution, the stronger supplier commands a higher profit relative to the
weaker supplier. Also note that an even allocation of profits between the two suppliers is
not possible under any of the power-imbalanced scenarios, provided product substitution
is significant.

Figure 3.2: π M* 1 /(π M* 1 + π M* 2 )
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As for the retailer’s profit, as shown in Figure 3.3, the retailer enjoys a larger
fraction of the supply chain profits as substitution increases while suppliers are left with
increasingly smaller percentage of the supply chain profits across all structures. However,
at very low level of product competition, the retailer surrenders this profit superiority
over the suppliers in structures (S1), (S6), and (S8), where the retailer’s decision power is
the weakest.
Which supplier’s products contribute the most to the supply chain profits? This
question is addressed in Figure 3.4. For supplier-power-balanced structures such as (S1),
(S2), and (S3), both product lines equally contribute to supply chain profits. However,
under power imbalance in suppliers, it is evident from Figure 3.4 that products from the

*
Figure 3.3: π R* / π SC
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*
*
*
Figure 3.4: (π SC
1 − π SC 2 ) / π SC

weaker supplier are responsible for most profits, and that contribution increases with
product substitution for all structures except (S7). In (S7), nevertheless, the additional
contribution from the products of the more powerful supplier diminishes and equalizes
with that of the weaker supplier when substitution is increased significantly.
Although the weaker supplier’s products are responsible for most profits in the
supply chain, as Figure 3.5 illustrates, the weaker supplier retains only a smaller
percentage of those profits compared to the powerful supplier. This is indeed true across
all structures, with (S5) having the highest disparity in profit sharing for the weak
supplier. As competition increases, however, such disparities begin to disappear. Thus,
the following characterization holds:
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*
*
*
Figure 3.5: π M* 1 / π SC
1 − π M 2 / π SC 2

Proposition 3.8: The relative power advantage of a supplier (over the other supplier)

allows him to retain a higher percentage of the profit generated by his/her own products
(in the supply chain) consistently at all levels of product substitution and in all supply
chain structures.

While the individual agents in a supply chain could be better/worse-off under
power imbalance, the supply chain as a whole can benefit under certain power balanced
structures. It can be shown for t > 0 that
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
π SC
3 > π SC 7 > π SC 8 > π SC 1 = π SC 2 > π SC 4 = π SC 5 = π SC 6 ,
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(3.5.1)

which implies that the most power-imbalanced structures generate the lowest total profits
for the supply chain. In contrast, when suppliers are offering independent products, i.e.,
t=0,
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
π SC
3 > π SC 7 = π SC 8 > π SC 1 = π SC 2 = π SC 4 = π SC 5 = π SC 6

(3.5.2)

holds, and thus, supplier power imbalances may not necessarily degrade the supply chain
total profits.

3.6 Conclusions and Discussions

In this chapter a two-supplier-one-retailer supply chain was investigated when suppliers
have unequal decision-making power, thus allowing one supplier to become a
Stackelberg leader over the other supplier. This consideration results in a set of eight
different channel structures, of which five have not been studied in the literature. We
model such situations as either two-stage or three-stage Bertrand Stackelberg hierarchies,
or one-stage non-cooperative games. Using a linear deterministic demand model that
allows for product substitution effects, we investigate important questions such as supply
chain performance, effects of product substitution, and structure dominance and stability.
Most notably, the following conclusions are reached: (i) A multiple-supplier-oneretailer supply chain performs as an integrated system when the degree of product
substitution is sufficiently large, (ii) The suppliers’ profits consistently decrease when
products become more substitutable, even if suppliers dominate the retailer. The retailer
benefits from a high degree of substitution in all possible structures, (iii) In a twosupplier-one-retailer supply chain, a small (niche) supplier may achieve more profit than
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a large supplier, (iv) “Absolute profits” cannot reflect the power structure of the multisupplier supply chain. However, “profit percentage” of each agent can represent the
relative power differences more accurately. (v) Certain supply chain structures are
dominant over the others, which implies that the relevant agents are better-off in making
a transition to dominating channel decision structure. Moreover, there exist channel
structures that exhibit stability in that a structure transition is not likely to occur so long
as agents are profit maximizers. In this context, both the Manufacturer-Stackelberg (S1)
and the Retailer-Stackelberg (S2) structures (Choi, 1991) do not exhibit stability.
Relatively small suppliers are, in general, regarded as underdogs in sharing profits
in the supply chain. However, the present analysis reveals that a small supplier may even
achieve more profit than the relatively large supplier, which provides one explanation
why niche suppliers thrive in markets that are dominated by giant suppliers. Empirical
studies based upon power-balanced supplier structures indicate certain inconsistency
between the theoretical models and observed real data, and in this context, our study
offers a realistic alternative viewpoint.
One limitation of the analysis in this chapter is the assumption of a linear
deterministic demand model, which essentially simplified the analysis resulting in closedform statistics. Under the first three structures of Figure 3.1, Choi (1991) shows that
derivation of closed-form results is analytically challenging when certain forms of
nonlinear demand models are used. Furthermore, unique Nash equilibrium is no longer
guaranteed in those cases. Our future research will address these issues.
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Chapter 4:
Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts when
Retailer Sells Store-Brand Products

4.1 Introduction
Store brands, or private labels, are those for which a retailer has control in pricing,
stocking, shelf placement, and marketing promotions. Store brands have emerged as
important sources of profits and have fostered better negotiation positions for the retailer
with outside suppliers. Therefore, store brands have seen substantial inroads in a variety
of product categories and have resulted in significant growth over the years. ACNielsen
Inc. (2005) 1 recently released its annual investigation on store brands across 38 countries
and 80 product categories, where it is stated that store-brand products represent a 17%
value-sales share and a 5% growth over the previous year. In particular, the North
American store brands had a share of 16%, and its growth was even more significant at
7%.
Academic research on the subject of store brands has also gained considerable
attention. For example, Cotterill et al. (2000) investigate the relationship between the
store-brand market share and influences such as pricing behaviors, retail concentration,
and cross-price elasticity; Hoch and Banerji (1993) discuss factors such as quality,
advertising, and price discounts that affect store-brand success; Raju et al. (1995)

1

We appreciate the permission of ACNielsen to cite the data.
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investigate the impact of competition on the introduction and performance of store
brands; Chintagunta et al. (2002) and Pauwels and Srinivasan (2004) offer studies on the
effect of store-brand entry; Sayman et al. (2002) and Morton and Zettelmeyer (2004)
study strategies for store-brand positioning in the retailer-manufacturer negotiations;
Mills (1995) and Narasimhan and Wilcox (1998) examine the role of store brands in
transaction negotiations, for instance.
However, the existing literature primarily focuses on identifying and evaluating
factors, as supported by empirical evidence, which influence the store-brand market share
and the incentives on store brands. Furthermore, many such studies assume a wholesaleprice contractual arrangement between the outside suppliers and retailers, i.e., retailers
pay a wholesale unit price to suppliers and keep all the sales revenues. To the best of our
knowledge, academic literature on does not consider using contracts for coordination in
supply chains involving store-brands. A supply chain is said to be coordinated if
individual decisions turn out to be optimal for the supply chain as a whole. This chapter
addresses the question of coordination under the application of revenue-sharing contracts
by which the retailers commit to share the sales revenue with the suppliers. Revenuesharing contracts have seen significant applications in practice. For instance, (outside)
suppliers such as Pepsi and Coca-Cola pay lump-sum fees to Wal-Mart for using shelf
space, and they are compensated with certain percentages of sales revenues from their
products. Consequently, the presence of store brands can significantly affect the supplierretailer interactions, and thus, such effects deserve in-depth analysis.
Revenue-sharing contracts are common in many applications, e.g., video rental
industry (Cachon and Lariviere 2005, Dana and Spier 2001), assembly systems (Gerchak
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and Wang 2004), and E-Commerce (Wang et al. 2005). Cachon and Lariviere (2005)
show that revenue-sharing is a possible contractual agreement for supply chain
coordination. See Cachon (2003), Lariviere (1999), and Sahin & Robinson (2002) for
excellent reviews on various mechanisms for coordination.
Besides the interaction between store brands and non-store brands, channel
interactions have been studied in terms of the number of agents involved. For instance,
for the case of one supplier and one retailer, Jeuland and Shugan (1983) and Moorthy
(1987) investigate channel coordination under “quantity discounts”. With two suppliers
and one retailer, Choi (1991) studies supplier-retailer interactions under different
decision-making power structures, and starting from that, Kadiyali et al (2000) consider a
certain generalization of Choi’s power models to measure supplier-retailer interactions in
which supplier-supplier interactions are subsumed. Given a channel with one supplier and
two retailers, Ingene and Parry (1995) consider coordination with “quantity discounts”
and “two-part tariff”. With two suppliers and two retailers, McGuire and Staelin (1983)
study agents’ pricing strategies for exclusive dealership structures where each retailer
carries only products from one supplier. In this context, Moothy (1988) answers the
question, “why strategic interaction among suppliers makes it possible for
decentralization to be a Nash equilibrium strategy.” Choi (1996) and Trivedi (1998) both
consider agents’ pricing interactions when retailers carry products from both suppliers;
Lee and Staelin (1997) study the value of Stackelberg pricing leadership within the
concept of “vertical strategic interaction” under different channel structures.
In this chapter, we investigate channel interactions when the retailer carries both the
national-brand and store-brand products. Assuming the retailer has more bargaining
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power in the supply chain, we model the situation as a Stackelberg game under a
revenue-sharing contract.
This study shows that a two-parameter revenue-sharing contract in which the
retailer pays a wholesale unit price, along with a certain percentage of sales revenue to
the supplier, can allocate the supply chain profit flexibly by adjusting the revenue-sharing
rate. In contrast, the profit division under a (usual) wholesale-price contract, or a oneparameter revenue-sharing contract, is uniquely determined in terms of the relative
demand functions and production costs. A one-parameter revenue-sharing contract refers
to the case when the only contractual parameter is the percentage of sales revenue paid by
the retailer to the supplier.
It follows that when the revenue-sharing rate is fixed, the retailer will let the
supplier determine his retail price and make decisions to optimize her own profit
function, i.e., non-coordinating decision. When the supplier specifies his wholesale price,
a non-coordinating wholesale-price contract is the optimal choice for the retailer. It is
also shown that when the supplier determines his retail price, and when the retailer can
specify both the wholesale-price and the revenue-sharing rate, the retailer’s coordinating
decisions lead to Pareto improvement in contrast to her non-coordinating decisions.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 presents the model
assumptions; Section 4.3 offers the integrated system as a benchmark; two scenarios for
the revenue-sharing contract implementation are discussed in Sections 4.4 and 4.5;
Section 4.6 discusses the agents’ performance and decision strategies; Conclusions are in
Section 4.7.
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4.2 Model Assumptions
Consider a one-supplier/manufacturer-one-retailer supply chain within a single business
season. The outside supplier sells national-brand products through a large retailer, and is
paid with a wholesale unit price, along with a certain percentage of retailer’s revenue
from his products. The outside retail price and wholesale price can be determined by
either the supplier or the retailer, while the revenue-sharing rate is determined based upon
negotiation. Besides carrying outside products, the retailer also sells her store-brand
products and determines that retail price by herself. We assume the store-brand products
are produced from an integrated system managed by the retailer, thus ignoring the
dynamics involving the retailer and any suppliers of the store-brand products. We
consider two decision scenarios, S1 and S2, for analysis:
i.

Scenario (S1): The retailer determines the outside (product) wholesale price as
well as the retail price for the store-brand product, while the supplier chooses the
retail price for his own products.

ii.

Scenario (S2): The retailer determines the outside retail price and the retail price
of store brands, while the supplier chooses his own wholesale price.
In each scenario, the outside supplier makes decisions to maximize his own profits,

while the retailer has the option of either maximizing the total supply chain profits
(termed a coordinating decision), or optimizing her own profits (termed a noncoordinating decision). Given the assumption that the retailer has more decision power
(than the outside supplier), the retailer is assumed to play the role of Stackelberg
leadership.
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Therefore, under S1, the retailer first issues the store-brand retail price ( p0 ) and the
wholesale price (w), and then, the outside supplier follows with his retail price ( p1 ). On
the other hand, under S2, the retailer first determines p0 and p1 , and then the supplier
follows with his decision w. The following additional notation is employed throughout
the chapter.

π SC : Supply chain profit,
π M : Outside supplier profit,
π R : Retailer profit,
q0 : Retailer store-brand product demand,
q1 : Outside product demand,
r: Revenue-sharing rate for outside product and 0 ≤ r ≤ 1 ,
c0 : Store-brand production cost ( c0 ≤ p0 ),
c1 : Outside production cost ( c1 ≤ p1 ).
It is assumed that the information is symmetric across the supply chain, the storebrand and national-brand products are substitutable, and both product demands are linear
deterministic in prices. In particular, the two products are assumed to have the following
format for their demand functions:
q0 = a0 − b0 p0 + tp1

(4.2.1)

q1 = a1 − b1 p1 + tp0

(4.2.2)

where a0 and a1 represent “market bases” of the two products, i.e., the demand if all
prices are set to zero, which thus describe customer brand loyalty of each product type;
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b0 and b1 measure the demand sensitivity on relative retail prices; t indicates the degree
of product substitution or competition, where a larger t represents a higher degree of
substitution (higher product competition). It is necessary that all demand parameters are
nonnegative, i.e., a0 , a1 , b0 , b1 , t ≥ 0, and t ≤ min{b0 , b1} for demands to be well-behaved,
see Ingene and Parry (1995). We further assume that ai − bi pi ≥ 0 , for i = 0,1 , which
indicates that demands are positive even when there is no competition (t=0).
The profit functions are then given by,

π SC = ( p0 − c0 )q0 + ( p1 − c1 )q1

(4.2.3)

π M = ((1 − r ) p1 + w − c1 )q1

(4.2.4)

π R = (rp1 − w)q1 + ( p0 − c0 )q0

(4.2.5)

4.3 Integrated System
We first obtain the optimal results for an integrated (or centrally coordinated) system in
which one agent makes decisions for the entire supply chain. We use these results as
benchmarks for performance comparison with the corresponding decentralized supply
chain, where each agent makes decisions independently (in a hierarchical manner). For a
decentralized supply chain, if the individual decisions lead to the same optimal
performance of the integrated system, then the decentralized supply chain is said to be
coordinated.
The integrated-system profit π SC is thus a function of the two retail prices p0 and

p1 , and the first order partial derivatives are
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∂π SC
∂π SC
= a0 + b0 c0 − tc1 − 2b0 p0 + 2tp1 ,
= a1 − tc0 + b1c1 − 2b1 p1 + 2tp0 ,
∂p0
∂p1

(4.3.1)

and the second order partial derivatives are
∂ 2π SC
∂ 2π SC
= −2b0 < 0 ,
= −2b1 < 0 , and
∂p02
∂p12

∂ 2π SC
= 2t .
∂p0 ∂p1

(4.3.2)

The determinant of the Hessian matrix,

∂ 2π SC
∂p02

∂ 2π SC
∂p0 ∂p1

∂ π SC
∂p0∂p1

∂ π SC
∂p12

2

2

= 4b0b1 − 4t 2 > 0 ,

since t ≤ min{b0 , b1} , which guarantees a unique solution to the problem: max π SC .
p0 , p1

Setting the gradient of π SC = 0 , the first order conditions yield
p0(* I ) =

a t + a0b1
a t + a1b0
1
1
, p1(* I ) = c1 + 0
,
c0 + 1
2
2
2(b0b1 − t )
2
2(b0b1 − t 2 )

(4.3.3)

and substituting (4.3.3) in (4.2.1) and (4.2.2), we have
q0(* I ) =

1
1
( a0 − b0 c0 + tc1 ) , q1(* I ) = ( a1 − b1c1 + tc0 ) ,
2
2

(4.3.4)

where p0(* I ) and q0(* I ) , and p1(* I ) and q1(* I ) represent the optimal store-brand retail price
and order quantity, and outside retail price and order quantity, respectively, for the
integrated-system,

whose

total

maximized

supply

chain

profit

*
*
*
*
*
π SC
( I ) = p0( I ) q0( I ) + p1( I ) q1( I ) .

The optimal retail prices consist of corresponding production costs and parameters
of both demand functions. Also, note that
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∂p0(* I )
∂b0
∂p1(* I )
∂b0
∂p0(* I )
∂t

=

*
∂π SC
(I )

∂c0

∂p0(* I )
b1 ( a1t + a0b1 )
t (a t + a1b0 )
=− 0
<0,
=−
<0,
2 2
∂b1
2(b0b1 − t )
2(b0b1 − t 2 ) 2

(4.3.5)

∂p1(* I )
t ( a1t + a0b1 )
b (a t + a1b0 )
=− 0 0
< 0,
=−
< 0,
2 2
∂b1
2(b0b1 − t )
2(b0b1 − t 2 ) 2

(4.3.6)

∂p1(* I ) a0t 2 + a0b0b1 + 2a1b0t
a1t 2 + a1b0b1 + 2a0b1t
,
=
> 0,
0
>
∂t
2(b0b1 − t 2 ) 2
2(b0b1 − t 2 ) 2

(4.3.7)

*
∂π SC
1
1
1
(I )
= [b1c1 − a1 − c0t ] < 0 .
= − ( a0 − b0 c0 ) − tc1 < 0 ,
2
2
∂c1
2

(4.3.8)

Proposition 4.3.1: The following hold for the integrated system at the optimum:

(a) Both retail prices are increasing in the corresponding production costs; both
order quantities are decreasing in the corresponding production costs and
increasing in the competitor’s production costs.
(b) Retail prices are increasing in the market bases ( a0 , a1 ) and the degree of product
substitution t; also, retail prices decrease with increasing b0 and b1 .
(c) The total supply chain profit decreases in production costs c0 and c1 .

4.4 Revenue-Sharing Contracts under Scenario (S1)
Under S1, with a two-parameter revenue-sharing contract, the retailer chooses the
wholesale price as well as the store-brand retail price, and the outside supplier specifies
his own retail price. The outside supplier’s profit maximization decision is conditional on
the revenue-sharing rate and the retailer’s decisions ( p0 , w ). Therefore, we first solve the
outside supplier’s problem: max π M , which yields
p1
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d π M ( p0 , p1 , r , w)
= t (1 − r ) p0 − 2b1 (1 − r ) p1 − b1w + a1 + b1c1 ,
dp1

(4.4.1)

and setting dπ M ( p0 , p1 , r , w) / dp1 =0,
p1* =

(1 − r )(a1 + tp0 ) + b1 ( w − c1 )
.
2b1 (1 − r )

(4.4.2)

Since d 2π M / dp12 = −2(1 − r )b1 < 0 , p1* in (4.4.2) solves the outsider’s problem.

4.4.1 The Case of Retailer Non-Coordinating Decisions (RNCD) under S1
In a non-coordinating decision framework, the retailer utilizes the supplier’s (reaction)
retail price function in (4.4.2) to choose both the wholesale price and the retail price for
store-brand products such that her own profit function is maximized, i.e., max π R :
p0 ,w

∂π R ( p1* , r ) b1 ( w − c1 ) + (1 − r )(a1 − tc0 − a1r − tp0 r + 2tp0 + b1w)
=
,
∂w
−2(1 − r ) 2
∂π R ( p1* , r )
= r 2 (a1t + t 2 p0 ) + r (2a0b1 + 2b0b1c0 + t 2 p0 − c0t 2 − tb1w − 4b0b1 p0 )
∂p0
.

(4.4.3)

(4.4.4)

+ (c0t 2 + 2b1wt + 4b0b1 p0 − a1t − tb1c1 − 2t 2 p0 − 2b0b1c0 − 2a0b1 )
The second order partial derivatives are

∂ 2π R
b(2 − r )
∂ 2π R
∂ 2π R rt 2 + 2t 2 − 4b0b1
(r − 2)t
=
<
0
=
0
,
,
=
≤
,
and
2
2
2
∂w
−2(1 − r )
2b1
∂w∂p0 2(1 − r )
∂p0
and thus, the determinant of the Hessian matrix,
∂ 2π R
∂w2

∂ 2π R
∂w∂p0

∂ 2π R
∂w∂p0

∂ 2π R
∂p02

=

(2 − r )(b0b1 − t 2 )
>0,
(1 − r ) 2
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(4.4.5)

which ensures that the first order solutions jointly maximize the retailer’s profit function.
That is,
p0(* S 1, NC ) =

w(*S 1, NC ) =
where

a t + a0b1
1
,
c0 + 1
2
2(b0b1 − t 2 )

(4.4.6)

( A − 2C )r 2 + (4C − A)r + ( Bc1 − 2C )
,
(2 − r ) B

A = a0b1t + a1t 2 + c0t 3 − b0b1c0t ,

B = 2b0b12 − 2b1t 2 , and

(4.4.7)

C = a0b1t + a1b0b1 , and

A, B, C ≥ 0 . In (4.4.6) and (4.4.7), the subscript pair (S1, NC) refers to the scenario S1,

and that it is in a non-coordinating decision. Substituting p0(* S 1, NC ) and w(*S1, NC ) in the
outside retail price function (4.4.2) gives
p1(* S 1, NC ) =

1
B
⎧
⎫
⎨( A − 2C )r + (3C + c1 − A) ⎬ .
B (2 − r ) ⎩
2
⎭

(4.4.8)

a1 − b1c1 + tc0
<0,
2b1 (r − 2) 2

(4.4.9)

dp1(* S 1, NC )

Note that

dr

=−

which implies that r=1 yields the lowest outside retail price under the case of RNCD, that
is, the smallest p1(* S 1, NC ) =

a t + a1b0
1
, which is identical to the corresponding price
c1 + 0
2
2(b0b1 − t 2 )

in the integrated system, see (4.3.3). Therefore, the retailer’s non-coordinating decision
increases the outside retail price in comparison to the integrated system. Meanwhile, the
revenue-sharing contract reduces to a wholesale-price contract with w(*S1, NC ) = c1 when

r=1. Also note that
dw(*S 1, NC )
dr

=

a0b1t + 2a1b0b1 − a1t 2 b1c1 − a1 tc0 (r 2 − 4r + 2)
,
+
+
2b1 (b0b1 − t 2 )
2b1 (r − 2) 2
b1 (r − 2) 2
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(4.4.10)

d 2 w(*S 1, NC )

and

i.e.,

dr
dw(*S 1, NC )
dr

2

=−

2(a1 − b1c1 + c0t )
< 0,
b1 (2 − r )3

(4.4.11)

2b1c1 (b0b1 − t 2 ) + b1t ( a0 − b0 c0 ) + c0t 3
> 0 when r=1, which is the smallest
=
2b1 (b0b1 − t 2 )

value of (4.4.10). Therefore, dw(*S1, NC ) / dr > 0 for r ∈ [0,1] , the non-coordinating
wholesale price increases in the revenue-sharing rate.
When r=0 (thus, the outside supplier retains all sales revenue), it follows that

w(*S1, NC ) <0, which implies that the retailer is paid a (wholesale) price of
| w(*S 1, NC ) |= [b0 (a1 − b1c1 ) + t 2 c1 + a0t ][2(b0b1 − t 2 )]−1 , and p1(* S 1, NC ) = (3C − 0.5Bc1 − A)(2 B) −1
in this case.
Under the retailer non-coordinating decision (RNCD) framework, the store-band
retail price (4.4.6) is identical to that of the integrated system, see (4.3.3), while the
outside retail price decreases in r due to (4.4.9). The following relationships hold on
order quantities.
Proposition 4.4.1: When 0 ≤ r < 1 and under RNCD, p1(* S 1, NC ) > p1(* I ) , q0(* S 1, NC ) > q0(* I ) and

q1(* S 1, NC ) < q1(* I ) hold.
Retailer non-coordinating decisions lead to the outside supplier delivering a quantity less
than that of the corresponding integrated system, while the retailer delivers more storebrand products at all levels of product substitutability, which thus improves the retailer’s
market share. The outside supplier’s profit in this case is

π M* ( S 1, NC ) =

1 1− r
[a1 − b1c1 + tc0 ]2 ,
(r − 2) 2 4b1
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(4.4.12)

and thus

d π M* ( S 1, NC )
dr

=

[a1 − b1c1 + tc0 ]2
r
≤0,
( r − 2)3
4b1

(4.4.13)

which implies that under RNCD, the outside supplier achieves his maximum profit of
[a1 − b1c1 + tc0 ]2 (16b1 ) −1 when r=0.

The retailer pockets a profit of π R _ M ( S 1, NC ) = ( rp1 − w) q1 from outside products, and
using the non-coordinating wholesale price and retail prices in (4.4.6)-(4.4.8), it can be
shown that

π R* _ M ( S1, NC ) =

[a1 − b1c1 + tc0 ][a1b0 + a0t + t 2 c0 − b0b1c0 ]
> 0,
4(2 − r )(b0b1 − t 2 )

(4.4.14)

i.e., the retailer profits from carrying the outside products for all r ∈ [0,1] .
Let π R ( S 1, NC ) represent the retailer’s total profit from selling both products, i.e.,

π R* ( S1, NC ) = (rp1* − w* )q1* + ( p0* − c0 )q0* . Then, for r ∈ [0,1] ,
d π R* ( S 1, NC ) / dr = [a1 − b1c1 + tc0 ]2 ( 4b1 (r − 2) 2 ) > 0 .
−1

(4.4.15)

That is, an increasing revenue-sharing rate enhances the retailer’s total profit. However,
because p0(* S 1, NC ) is independent of r, see (4.4.6), and an increasing r leads to a lower

p1(* S 1, NC ) as in (4.4.9), as well as a lower store-brand order quantity, a higher revenuesharing rate undermines the store-brand’s profitability.

4.4.2 The Case of Retailer Coordinating Decisions (RCD) under S1

Suppose the retailer makes decisions to optimize the total supply chain profit in an
attempt to achieve coordination. Substituting p1* of (4.4.2) into the total channel profit
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function π SC in (4.2.3), the gradient expressions of π SC are:

∂π SC ( p0 , w) t (1 − r )(c0 − p0 ) + b1 (c1r − w)
=
,
∂w
2(1 − r ) 2

and,

∂π SC ( p0 , w)
=
∂p0

2
2
⎪⎧r (2a1t + 3 p0t − c0t + 2a0b1 + 2b0b1c0 − 4b0b1 p0 − b1c1t ) ⎪⎫
⎨
⎬
2
2
⎩⎪+ (c0t − 3 p0t + 4b0b1 p0 − 2a0b1 − 2b0b1c0 + b1wt − 2a1t ) ⎭⎪

2b1 (r − 1)

(4.4.16)

. (4.4.17)

The second order partial derivatives of π SC are

∂ 2π SC ( p0 , w)
−b1
∂ 2π SC ( p0 , w) −4b0b1 + 3t 2
=
<0,
=
<
0
,
2
2
∂w
2(1 − r ) 2
∂p0
2b1

(4.4.18)

and the determinant of the Hessian matrix is

∂ 2π SC
∂p02

∂ 2π SC
∂p0∂w

∂ 2π SC
∂p0 ∂w

∂ 2π SC
∂w2

=

b0b1 − t 2
>0.
2(1 − r ) 2

(4.4.19)

Therefore, the supply chain profit function is strictly concave in ( p0 , w) for 0 ≤ r < 1 .
Setting ∇π SC ( p0 , w) = 0 yields
a t + a0b1
1
,
c0 + 1
2
2(b0b1 − t 2 )

(4.4.20)

1
[( A + Bc1 ) r − A] ,
B

(4.4.21)

p0(* S 1, C ) =

and

w(*S 1, C ) =

Subscript S1 refers to the scenario and C refers to retailer’s coordinating decision (RCD)
framework. Observe that p0(* S 1, C ) is identical to that of the integrated system.
Observe that the store-brand retail price is independent of revenue-sharing rate, see
(4.4.20). In contrast, the wholesale price monotonically increases in r due to (4.4.21). As
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such, the highest wholesale price under a “coordinating revenue-sharing” contract equals
the outside supplier’s production cost. On the other hand, when r=0, w(*S1, C ) = − A / B ≤ 0 ,
i.e., the supplier pays a wholesale price to the retailer for receiving all the sales revenue.
Substituting (4.4.20) and (4.4.21) back into the outside retail price in (4.4.2), we
have
p1(* S 1, C ) =

a t + a1b0
1
.
c1 + 0
2
2(b0b1 − t 2 )

(4.4.22)

Optimal retail prices (4.4.20) and (4.4.22) are identical to those of the
corresponding integrated system. That is,
Proposition 4.4.2: When the retailer makes decisions to optimize the overall supply

chain profits, the two-parameter revenue-sharing contract achieves coordination.
Note that as r → 1 , the retailer attains all the sales revenue and the two-parameter
revenue-sharing contract reduces to a wholesale-price contract, which leaves no profit for
the supplier due to w(*S1, C ) = c1 in this case. Alternatively, if r = A( A + Bc1 ) −1 ,
then w(*S 1, C ) =0, i.e., the two-parameter revenue-sharing contract simplifies as a oneparameter revenue-sharing contract.
Proposition 4.4.3: When the outside supplier determines his retail price, the wholesale-

price contract cannot be used for coordination, and the one-parameter revenue-sharing
rate is uniquely determined by the costs and demand parameters of both agents.
For products ordered from the outside supplier,

and

π M* ( S1, C ) = [(1 − r ) p1(* S1, C ) + w(*S1, C ) − c1 ]q1(* S1, C ) ,

(4.4.23)

π R* _ M ( S1, C ) = (rp1(* S1, C ) − w(*S1, C ) )q1(* S1, C ) ,

(4.4.24)
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where π M* ( S 1, C ) is the outside-supplier’s profit, and π R* _ M ( S 1, C ) is the retailer’s profit from
selling outside products. Noting (4.4.20)-(4.4.22), we have,

π M* ( S 1, C ) =

π R* _ M ( S 1, C )

(1 − r )[b1c1 − a1 − c0t ]2
,
4b1

(4.4.25)

⎛ [a1 − b1c1 + c0t ]
⎞
⎜
⎟
2
2
3
{b0b1[a1 − b1c1 ] + a1t (1 − r ) + b1t c1 + c0t (1 − r ) + b1t (a0 − b0c0 )} ⎠
⎝
=
> 0 , (4.4.26)
4b1 (b0b1 − t 2 )

Letting r = 0 ,

π M* ( S 1, C ) =

[b1c1 − a1 − c0t ]2
[a − b c + c t ][a t 2 + c0t 3 + a0b1t − b0b1c0t ]
, π R* _ M ( S 1, C ) = 1 1 1 0 1
. (4.4.27)
4b1
4b1 (b0b1 − t 2 )

That is, when the supplier captures all sales revenue from his products, the retailer still
profits from outside products since w(*S1, C ) = − A / B ≤ 0 holds, that is, the supplier pays a
unit price of A / B to the retailer. Therefore, the retailer can always profit from selling
outside products when the supplier chooses the retail price. Also note that for the
retailer’s total profit π R* ( S 1, C ) ,
d π R* ( S 1, C )
dr

(a1 − b1c1 + c0t ) 2
=
> 0,
4b1

(4.4.28)

i.e., a higher revenue-sharing rate increases the retailer’s total profit.

4.5 Revenue-sharing Contracts under Scenario (S2)

Under the decision scenario (S2), the outside supplier chooses the wholesale price
conditioned on his retail margin and the store-brand retail price, given that the retailer
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specifies both retail prices. Let m be the retail margin of outside products, then p1=w+m
and dp1 / dw = 1 , and the outside supplier’s decision problem is, max π M , where
w

π M = [(1 − r ) p1 + w − c1 ]q1 = [(1 − r )( w + m) + w − c1 ][a1 − b1 ( w + m) + tp0 ] .

(4.5.1)

The corresponding first-order and second-order conditions of the outside-supplier profit
function are
d π M ( p0 , p1 )
= (1 − r )(a1 − b1 p1 + tp0 ) − b1[(1 − r ) p1 + w − c1 ] ,
dw

dπ M2
= −2b1 (1 − r ) < 0 .
dw2

(4.5.2)

(4.5.3)

Therefore, the first order solution leads to the unique optimal wholesale price
w* = c1 +

a1 (2 − r ) − b1 p1 (3 − 2r ) + tp0 (2 − r )
.
b1

(4.5.4)

4.5.1 The Case of Retailer Non-Coordinating Decisions (RNCD) under S2

In the non-coordinating decision framework, the retailer chooses retail prices to optimize
her own profit function, i.e., max π R . The second order conditions in this case are
p0 , p1

∂ 2π R
∂ 2π R
∂ 2π R
2(2 − r )t 2
,
=
−
2
b
(3
−
r
)
<
0
,
2
b
0
=
−
−
<
= 2t (3 − r ) ,
0
1
∂p12
b1
∂p02
∂p0 ∂p1

(4.5.5)

and the determinant of the Hessian matrix
∂ 2π R
∂p02

∂ 2π R
∂p0 ∂p1

∂ πR
∂p0∂p1

∂ πR
∂p12

2

2

= 4(3 − r )(b0b1 − t 2 ) > 0 .
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(4.5.6)

That is, the retailer profit function is jointly concave in ( p0 , p1 ) for 0 ≤ r ≤ 1 . Setting
∇π R ( p0 , p1 ) = 0 results in the optimized retail prices,
p0(* S 2, NC ) =

p1(* S 2, NC ) =

and

a t + a0b1
1
,
c0 + 1
2
2(b0b1 − t 2 )

Bc1
1
⎧
⎫
+ 5C − 2 A]⎬ ,
⎨( A − 2C )r + [
B (3 − r ) ⎩
2
⎭

(4.5.7)

(4.5.8)

where A, B, and C are defined in Section 4.4.1. It is clear that the store-brand retail price
is independent of r and it is identical to the corresponding integrated system’s retail price.
Note that
dp1(* S 2, NC )
dr

=−

(b0b1 − t 2 )(a1 − b1c1 + c0t )
< 0.
B(3 − r ) 2

(4.5.9)

Accordingly, the outside retail price is the smallest when r=1, that is,

p1(* S 2, NC )

r =1

= (6C − 2 A + Bc1 )(4 B)−1 . In comparison to the integrated system’s, p1(* I ) ,
p1(* S 2, NC )

*
r =1 − p1( I ) =

(b0b1 − t 2 )(a1 − b1c1 + c0t )
> 0.
2B

(4.5.10)

This comparison indicates that the supply chain will not be coordinated with retailer’s
non-coordinating decisions for r ∈ [0,1] .
Proposition 4.5.1: Under decision scenario S2, and retailer’s non-coordinating

framework, the store-brand retail price remains identical to that of the integrated system,
while the outside retail price is higher than the corresponding retail price of the
integrated system for r ∈ [0,1] .
The above result resembles a similar property as in the case of S1, see Proposition
4.4.1, that the retailer’s non-coordinating decisions increase her market share due to
93

product substitutability, while the total supply chain profit declines in comparison to the
integrated system.
Letting T = a0t + a1b0 , the non-coordinating optimal results in S2 are represented as
w(*S 2, NC ) =

−[(a1 + c0t )C + b1T ]r 2 + [(2a1 + 2tc0 )C + 4b1t 2 ]r + (3b1c1C − 3b1T )
,
2b1C (3 − r )

(4.5.11)

(a1 − b1c1 + tc0 ) 2 (2 − r )
,
4b1 (3 − r ) 2

(4.5.12)

π M* ( S 2, NC ) =

π R* _ M ( S 2, NC ) =

(a1 − b1c1 + tc0 )[T − (b0b1 − t 2 )c1 ]
,
4(b0b1 − t 2 )(3 − r )

(4.5.13)

where w(*S 2, NC ) is the wholesale price, π M* ( S 2, NC ) is the supplier profit, and π R* _ M ( S 2, NC ) is
the retailer profit shared from outside products. Note that
d π M* ( S 2, NC )

(1 − r )(a1 − b1c1 + c0t ) 2
> 0,
4b1 (2 − r )3

(4.5.14)

(a1 − b1c1 + tc0 )[T − (b0b1 − t 2 )c1 ]
>0,
4(b0b1 − t 2 )(3 − r ) 2

(4.5.15)

dr
d π R* _ M ( S 2, NC )
dr

=

=

and for the retailer’s total profit π R* ( S 2, NC ) , we have
d π R* ( S 2, NC )
dr

=

(a1 − b1c1 + tc0 ) 2
>0.
4b1 (3 − r ) 2

(4.5.16)

Therefore, an increasing revenue-sharing rate leads to higher profit for the supplier.
Moreover, the retailer’s total profits as well as profit generated from outside products
increase as revenue-sharing rate increases. As such, under the scenario S2, both the
supplier and the retailer maximize their profits when r=1, which indeed is a wholesaleprice contract.
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Proposition 4.5.2: Under decision scenario S2, when the retailer seeks to optimize her

own profit, a wholesale-price contract assures both the supplier and the retailer the
largest possible profits.

4.5.2 The Case of Retailer Coordination Decisions (RCD) under S2

In coordinating decisions, the retailer chooses retail prices on the basis of the entire
supply chain, which leads to the same retail prices as those of the integrated system:
p0(* S 2, C ) =

a t + a0b1
a t + a1b0
1
1
and p1(* S 2, C ) = c1 + 0
.
c0 + 1
2
2
2(b0b1 − t )
2
2(b0b1 − t 2 )

(4.5.17)

Using forward substitution,
w(*S 2, C ) =

Bc1 ⎫
1⎧
]⎬ .
⎨[ A + Bc1 ]r + [C − 2 A −
B⎩
2 ⎭

(4.5.18)

As in the case of S1, see (4.4.21), the coordinating wholesale price increases in r, and
given the same revenue-sharing rate, it can be shown that the difference between the
coordinating wholesale prices under S2 and S1 is ( a1 − b1c1 + tc0 )(2b1 ) −1 > 0.
Proposition 4.5.3: For any given revenue-sharing rate, the coordinating wholesale price

under S2 is larger than that under S1, where the price difference is constant at
( a1 − b1c1 + tc0 )(2b1 ) −1 .

The supplier profit is,

π M* ( S 2, C ) =

(2 − r )[a1 − b1c1 + tc0 ]2
.
4b1

(5.19)

It is clear that the supplier’s profit decreases in r, which is different from the noncoordinating case, see (4.5.14). As a result, the supplier’s profit ranges from
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[a1 − b1c1 + tc0 ]2 (4b1 ) −1 to [a1 − b1c1 + tc0 ]2 (2b1 ) −1 under retailer’s coordinating decisions

under scenario S2.
For the retailer’s total profit π R* ( S 2, C ) , it can be shown that
d π R* ( S 2, C )
dr

(a1 − b1c1 + tc0 ) 2
=
>0,
4b1

(4.5.20)

i.e., the retailer’s total profit increases in the revenue-sharing rate. That is, the retailer
achieves the highest profit when r=1, and the two-parameter revenue-sharing contract
reduces to a wholesale-price contract in this case.
Furthermore, it can be shown that w(*S 2, C ) = (a1 + b1c1 + tc0 )(2b1 ) −1 > c1 for r=1. In
contrast to the case of S1, where the coordinating wholesale-price contract leaves no
profit for the supplier since the optimal wholesale price equals the production cost, the
supplier can still make profit under S2.
The one-parameter revenue-sharing contract does not apply in scenario S2 in that
the wholesale price is the supplier’s decision variable. Also note that in both scenarios
and both coordinating and non-coordinating decisions, the store-brand retail prices are
always set optimal as for the entire supply chain, which partially explains why the storebrand products are always observed with low prices.
Proposition 4.5.4: The store-brand retail prices are consistently set the same as that of

the integrated system, regardless of the decision rights scenarios or the retailer’s
preference for coordinating or non-coordinating decisions.
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4.6 Performance Comparison and Decision Strategies

The preceding sections analyzed retailer’s four possible decision frameworks, namely,
the case of S1/RNCD, S1/RCD, S2/RNCD, and S2/RCD. Our focus next is on conditions
under which the retailer chooses one of these frameworks for decision making. We first
analyze the retailer’s decision making under scenario S2 in which the supplier specifies
the wholesale price.
As shown in Section 4.5, the retailer’s total profits increase in the revenue-sharing
rate in both RNCD and RCD frameworks, see (4.5.16) and (4.5.20). Furthermore, it can
be shown that

π R* ( S 2, NC ) |r =0 −π R* ( S 2, C ) |r =1 =

(a1 − b1c1 + tc0 ) 2
>0.
12b1

(4.6.1)

That is, under scenario S2, the least possible profit for the retailer under non-coordinating
decisions is larger than the largest possible profit under coordinating decisions.
Combining with the result in Proposition 4.5.2 that a wholesale-price contract maximizes
the profits for both the retailer and the supplier under retailer’s non-coordinating
decisions, the following conclusion is reached:
Proposition 4.6.1: When the supplier chooses the wholesale price, a non-coordinating

wholesale-price contract is the optimal choice for the retailer.
Under S1, where the supplier chooses his retail price, the retailer’s total profit in
both non-coordinating and coordinating decisions increase in r, see (4.4.13) and (4.4.25).
Comparing the retailer’s non-coordinating profits under the two scenarios S1 and S2, it
can be shown that,

π R* ( S1, NC ) |r =0 −π R* ( S 2, NC ) |r =1 = 0 .
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(4.6.2)

That is, under non-coordinating decisions, the retailer’s smallest total profit under S1 is
equal to the largest possible total profit under S2. From the retailer’s perspective, the
retailer’s non-coordinating two-parameter contract under S1 thus

outperforms any

contracting decision under scenario S2. Also note that in S1, for a given revenue-sharing
rate r, where 0 ≤ r ≤ 1 , it can be shown that π R* ( S 1, NC ) > π R* ( S 1, C ) . The following result thus
holds:
Proposition 4.6.2: When the revenue-sharing rate is fixed, the retailer will let the

supplier determine his retail price and make decisions to optimize her own profit
function.

Suppose there is an (outside) niche supplier and the supplier-retailer transactions
occur only if the supplier is assured with a minimum profit level of H under a revenuesharing contract. Consider the case of S1. The retailer is then able to set both the
wholesale price and the revenue-sharing rate to capture the rest of the supply chain profit.
Furthermore, given that the supplier assumes H in S1 and H = π M* ( S 1, NC ) (r1 ) , where r1 is
the revenue-sharing rate and r1 ∈ [0,1] , the retailer’s total profit using non-coordinating
*
*
*
*
decisions is π R* ( S1, NC ) (r1 ) = π SC
( S 1, NC ) ( r1 ) − H ≤ π SC ( S 1, C ) − H since π SC ( S 1, NC ) ( r1 ) ≤ π SC ( S 1, C ) ,
*
noting that the coordinated supply chain attains the highest profit π SC
( S 1, C ) independent of

the revenue sharing rate. Therefore, the retailer can issue a revenue-sharing rate r2 such
*
*
*
that π R* ( S 1, C ) (r2 ) = π SC
( S 1, C ) − H ' . Due to π SC ( S 1, NC ) ( r1 ) ≤ π SC ( S 1, C ) , there exists a feasible

range of r2 that corresponds to any r1 ∈ [0,1) for H ' ≥ H and π R* ( S 1, C ) (r2 ) ≥ π R* ( S1, NC ) (r1 ) .
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That is, given a minimum required profit H for the supplier to be achieved under RNCD,
the retailer can alternatively specify a coordinating revenue-sharing rate r2 to assure both
agents more profit in contrast to the non-coordinating decisions.
Proposition 4.6.3: Under S1, for any profit level that the supplier achieves in retailer’s

non-coordinating decisions, there exist a retailer coordinating decision that specifies an
alternative pair of wholesale price and revenue-sharing rate that leads to Pareto
improvement.

The property of Proposition 4.6.3 can be illustrated in Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1 Profits under Scenario S1
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Figure 4.1 is based on the equilibrium results of S1 and by setting a0 = a1 = 10 ,
b0 = b1 = 5 , t = 1 , and c0 = c1 = 1 . In the legend of the figure, “Mnc” represents the
supplier’s profit under RNCD, “Mc” represents his profit under RCD, “Rnc” is the
retailer’s non-coordinating profit, and “Rc” is the retailer’s coordinating profit.
In terms of the supplier’s non-coordinating profit achieved at r = 0.4 , there exists a
Pareto area noted by r ∈ [0.61, 0.72] where the retailer’s coordinating decisions allow
both agents to achieve better profits.

From the supplier’s standpoint, a retailer coordinating decision leads to higher
profit than a non-coordinating decision at any revenue-sharing rate. To see this, define
the constant D = ( a1 − b1c1 + tc0 ) 2 ( 4b1 ) −1 . Then, the outside supplier’s profits under the
four decision frameworks can be shown in Table 4.1, where profits are indicated per unit
of D. Also in the same table, the lower and upper bounds on these profits are shown as r
varies from 0 to 1. Indeed, r need not take on the same value in different decision
frameworks.
Observe that the supplier total profit range covered by the non-coordinating
(RNCD) decisions is [0,1 / 4] ∪ [ 2 / 9,1 / 4] = [0,1 / 4] , while that due to coordinating (RCD)
Table 4.1: Supplier’s Profit under Four Decision Frameworks
(S1, RNCD)

(S1, RCD)

(S2, RNCD)

(S2, RCD)

Supplier
profit/D

1− r
(2 − r ) 2

1− r

2−r
(3 − r ) 2

2−r

Supplier profit
range/D

[0,1/ 4]

[0,1]

[2 / 9,1/ 4]

[1, 2]
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decisions is [0,1] ∪ [1,2] = [0,2] . Since [0,1 / 4] ⊂ [0,2] , it follows that at any level of r, the
supplier is better-off under coordinating decisions, so long as K ∈ [0, 2] , where K the
supplier’s profit per unit D. In particular, if K ∈ [1/ 4,1] , then retailer must use the (S1,C)
framework, whereas if K ∈ [1, 2] , the retailer must use the (S2,C) decision framework.
Indeed, for K > 2 , there is no feasible relationship between the retailer and the supplier.
A graphical illustration of the above analysis is in Figure 4.2 using the same
parameters as in Figure 4.1. The legends Ms1nc, Ms1c, Ms2nc, and Ms2c represent the
supplier profits per unit D in frameworks of S1/RNCD, S1/RCD, S2/RNCD, and
S2/RCD, respectively.

Figure 4.2: Supplier Profits
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4.7 Discussions and Conclusions

This chapter investigates the supply chain coordination problem when the retailer sells
store-brand products in a single retailer-single supplier framework. We modeled the
(outside) supplier-retailer interactions via revenue-sharing contracts and assumed the
retailer always takes the role of Stackelberg leadership. Two scenarios of decision
making are studied: first, the supplier chooses his own retail price only, and second, the
supplier determines his own wholesale price only.
Our research shows that a two-parameter revenue-sharing contract with its ability
to share profit flexibly outperforms a wholesale-price contract or a one-parameter
revenue-sharing contract. When the supplier is “let” to choose his retail price and the
retailer can justify both the wholesale price and the revenue-sharing rate, the retailer’s
coordinating decisions generate Pareto improvement over non-coordinating decisions,
although coordination undermines market share and profitability of the store-brand
product. In contrast, when the supplier determines his wholesale price, a noncoordinating wholesale-price contract is an optimal choice for the retailer.
This research offers certain practical implications. For instance, in the case of WalMart, a one-parameter revenue-sharing contract limits her share of revenue that is
uniquely determined by both products’ cost and demand structures, whereas the twoparameter revenue-sharing contracts have the flexibility in allocating profits. This
research also illustrates the importance of store-brand strategy. For example, the
existence of store brands not only provides a source of profit for retailers but also, it
avoids suppliers’ pricing collusion due to the fact that any such high pricing allows the
102

store-brand products to capture more market share and thus more profit from store-brand
product.
Our future research will focus on how information asymmetry impacts the decision
in a supply chain with retailer selling store-brand and outside supplier products with a
revenue-sharing contract.
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